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hs own county. There is no point af removing a discovered “ source” iy Moscow, unless it is known fiat ‘gy is about to be brought tw ual, with the risk that further unflis- covered “sources.” will be given away. “ Sources,” who are often unstable versonalities, tend to suller from wiuxiely. “From time to time they develop “out-station” nerves, and Sombard Moscow with requests to ee given asylum. Part of the Resi- dent Director's job is ta soothe them down, keep them on the job. A promise is. of course, made to all “sources” that, if they ever are elected, they and their families will be saved and taken to Moscow—but only when detection is certain and would lead to a public scandal, In vases where evacuation would be the cause of the scandal, as it vas vil Burgess and Maclean, evaciyfa- io would not normally be carripd ou should be added that the busi- hess of arranging an evacuation is vomplex and requires several weeks of preparation, Many agents have to be diverted into arranging it; false, vassports have to be made, and every detail carefully organised. The cost of maintaining useless evacuces mm Moscow is also unwelcome. In short, however hard he may beg to be removed to the Soviet Union the “source” will be left in his own country unless there is some extra- adinaty reason for removing him. Now, it appears from the White Paper that Burgess and Maclean ware not in danger of arrest. Tri iag White Paper says that Maclean was going to be interviewed on sifs- picion, and this evidently beeathe kyown to bim. But—and we must lopk at this through the eyes of the mpn in Moscow who had to decide whether to evacuate hiny—it was not Dy any means certain that this inquiry would result in a public scandal. On the evidence of the White Paper, Maclean was in danger, at|worst, of being called upon to resign. In that event the British public would have heard nothing of what lay behind the ¢ OF course. if the British witheri- lies could have produced conerbte evificnce that Maclean had bgen communicating secret informatiqn, ihgy could have prosecuted hits; and probably have had him im- prisoned. But, according to the White Paper, no such evidence existed at the time, and this is the fact which would normally weigh most with the Soviet espionage authorities. if Burgess and Maclean were not in the situation which normally warrants cvacuation, why did the Soviet authorities take this extray ordinary step ? Husband and Wife As it is clear that the evacuation of these men was fully prepared, and as the only danger that seems to have confronted them was that of questioning, it seems likely that the Russians feared they might have iferiminated others if they broke down under questioning. Both men were admitiedly unstable characters, liable to breakdowns. (Once the Russians had evacuated Maclean they were bound, in my opinign, to go on to evacuate his wife: to fave taken the husband and left his \wife would have had a damaging effect on Soviet “sources” all over the world.) This supposition need not mean that the Russians have, or had, a super-spy in the middle of the British Government machine. They mig’ have been mistaken—the battle of Kharkov was lost by the Russians because one of their best “sources” in Nazi Germany had become the dupe of a “double” agent. What scems at least certain is that Moscow not only knew Maclean was going to be questioned itself remarkable cnough—but alfo thought that he aad Burgess uht incriminate others or another mére important than two expefd- able “ sources” such as themselvgs THE story of Burgess and Mactean is one of the most fascinating lof our time. Part of its interest js that Maclean was in many ways a “golden boy,” of our com- wunity—Libecal family background. “ progressive” Vicws, combined with an aristocratic demeanour. | Alger Hiss was fascinating lo Anietica because he seemed the per- fect specimen of a “ New Dealer”; hq was both attacked and defenged so]hotly because of this. Maclfan anfi Burgess are to-day being ¢e- nojinced eiffier as Public , Schgol préducts or as Left-wing ‘intellec- : tuals, Yet Dr. Klaus Fuchs, ¢he sheially colourless emigré, yas ; plobably a far more valuable Sovjer agent than Maclean or Burge§s. {bw he escaped detection for so long provoked far’ Jess demand for inquiries. It seems to be the social, rather than the security, initicance of such cases that excites. There can be no doubt that some~ ! ching has been seriously wrong with our security services. They need | thorough investigation. li wauld not, however, be a sound ideg te hid that investigation in publid or in} the spirit of an indignagon keting. ! Puy: and Confusion... TPMAT much of the Press is not sii- cercly concerned about securty js evident enough : one of the papers that most fervently proclaims its | patriotic worries yesterday gave Is vuess of who was head of our “fntelligence department” in 1949 —<learly an intended deliberate breach of security. Even the papers that respect security most scrupu- fously have some odd ideas 08 the subject “Ef there was suspicioa of espionage in his [Burgess’s} ease, the evidence should be in ihe White Paper.” states The Tintes: is that the | place for such evidence? The fact that Maclean was allowed to get out Fat tie country shocks the Man- j chester Guardian: but woukd thai paper approve legislation empower- ig a secret police to detain people without clear evidence of guilt? The public hus every right to know that an inquiry ¢ impartial and implacable men Is being made, | Parliament should, we believe, press | for such a commission. But its findd- inys shoukl remain secret; and if its members are satisticd, that should be enough. Otherwise security must become increasingly breached. To increase parliamentary of mints- | terial watchfulness of our officials, apd public understanding of engmy nlcthods, is a duty: to try to bipak ifto our own official secrets if a hlghly irresponsible form’ of ener tdinment.