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DAVID LAWRENCE 3 ¢ oem 10 Who Fipped U. S. Hand in Korea? Br Su ‘Were the! $2,500 American boys who were killed in Korea, and the more than 103,000 who were wounded, betrayed by Communist spies operating in the British Foreign Office or the British Embassy in Wash- ington? ‘That is the big question now being posed as a result af the disclosures thafyDonald Mac- Lean. and GuyBurgess were ‘Communist agents and that a third person—a British intel gence officer who lived with Burgess in Washington—was the man who tipped off the other two ahd enabled them to escape behind the Iron Cur- tain. Burgess was an) official in the British Embassy here. clean also served in the bassy for a time and, though hil record was bad. he was neyertheless permitted to take criirge of the "American desk” in the British Foreign Office in November, 1950, under the Socialist Labor government. In that very month, the Red Chinese first sent a few units of troops across the Manchurian border into Korea and Gen. MacArthur promptly asked for permission to bomb the bridges across the Yalu and keep out any further forces. But, although the United States Joint Chiefs of Stal asked for immediate au- thority to send MacArthur such orders, the State Depart- ment felt obligated to consult the other 13 governments which had troops in Korea— and one of these was the Brit- ish. The request was made by the American Secretary of State on November 13, but the word came back that the allies yejected tt. This was highly secret information, but evi- gently the ,Red Chinese learned that there was no great dai in their inter- vention—ng flanger of an at- tack on tl ases in the rear —and they"wgnt ahead on No- vember 25 with a - full-scale intervention that turned the tide of the Korean war. What did the State Depart- any ae Pec? Spy Disclosures Support ions of Our Top Military ment teli the other govern- ments? How much of this in- formation passed through the hands of MacLean tn the Brit- ish Foreign Office? What did he do with it? Senator East- Jand, chairman of the Senate Bubcormittee on Internal Se- curity, has asked several ques- tions about this in a letter to Secretary Dulles. Viadimir Petrov, the Soviet official who defected in Aus- tralia, has established that MacLean and Burgess were for years supplying documents from the British Foreign Of- fice to the Soviet government. This became known only a few weeks ago and has re~ yived interest in the states ments made by various Ameri- can military men who have suspected that somebody had betrayed them in Korea. The Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, in its formal report last January, said: “The senior military com- Manders in the Korean war theater who appeared before the Internal Security Subcom- mittee of the Senate Commit- tee on the Judiciary believe that possible subversion, wish- ful thinking, European orlen- tation and Allied pressure de- nied them victory . .. “The senior military com- manders in the Korean war theater . . . supplied some clues to possible subversion tn Government departments, but were unable to make ‘specific charges.” Most'important, however, is the statement of military doc- trine which came from one after another of the military commanders concerning enemy behavior at the time of the Red Chinese intervention, Gen. Mark Clark, Gen. Stratemeyer, Gen. MacArthur, Gen. Almond and Gen. Van Fleet have all indicated by their testimony that the Red Chinese must have known they would run no risks by inter- vening in Korea. Here is the colloquy at the Senate hear ing with Gen. Van Fleet, com- mander United States 8th —. 4 Army from April, 1951, to February, 1953: “Q. Do you believe that the Chinese Communists would have crossed the Yalu without assurance that our military action would be limited? * “A, No. He (the enemy) would not have entered Korea if he did not feel safe from ate tack in North Chine and Man- churia.“' Here is an extract from a letter to Senator Byrd. Demo- crat of Virginia, written by Gen. MacArthur on April 19, 1953: “By one process or another it was conjectured by, or con~ veyed to, the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our military forces within their own area.” Here 1s what Gen. Almond, commander of the 10th United States Army Corps from Sep~ tember, 1950, to July, 1951, said to the. Senate committee: “The things as they hap- peried looked very strange in- sofar as the assurance with which the enemy appeared operate. I think it would have been a very hazardous thing for the Chinese to enter North Korea in the abundant num- bers In which they did if they had thought their bases of rice or ammunition or any other base would be subject to at- tack.” Who gave the Red Chinese that assurance? MacLean was in @ position to do so because he knew almost everything the American commanders would do, for he handled messages on these subjects as they passed to and from London, Whether the information went direct to the Soviets in Moscow and then from Mos- cow to Peiping, or whether It went by way of some other intermediate capital is irrele- vant. The circumstantial evi- dence points to the fact that the Soviet government had two Communist agents inside the British government at a time ‘when it was vital to know what. the American military com- manders would be permitted to do if the Chinese Communist armies intervened In Korea, (Reproduction Riphig-zesersey,.”Y |" "7 a _ PER i201 KEY Mr. Tolson ee Mr. Boardman Mr, Nichols a Mr. Belmont Mr. Harbo Mr. Mohr + Mr. Parsons‘ Mr. Rosen Mr, Tamm Mr. Sizoo _ Mr. Winterrowd —____ Tele. Room Mr. Holloman —____ Miss Gandy —___ Wash. Post Wash. News and Times Herald Wash. Stor A? =/.5 N. Y. Herald Tribune N.Y. Mirror Daily Worker ___ The Worker New Leader ______ — wee "2/7 4 va a Date ZO RIG Ss CR. Mee beneke! Mu ‘ WN 22 1979