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Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 14
Page 78
78 / 85
Text of Statement Issued:
By Burgess and Maclean
Dig (hbeseroo}
t
a . 11 (—Text of a statempnDissued in
- Mossou fodgt Fy patastng British diplomats. Guy-Burgess and
' Donald” Mai , as brbatecctby Moscow Radio/\—— j
It Beenie s doubts and | fe nelther of us have ever
speculation our present) bec agents.
whereabouts and our former ac-
tivity may.represent a small but
significant factor which has
hitherto been used and may
again be used by opponents of|
Anglo-Soviet understanding.
In view of these considerations ‘ ——
int it better to publish! 4s regards Maclea:
this statement : in the-aifclal diplostatic tefvice!
“We arrived in the Soviet Union) in London and Patis, Washing-
In order to-make our contribu-| ton and Cairo from 1935 to 1951,
tion to @ policy almed at achiev-| thus being part of the: machine
ing greater mutual understand-| which, with the exception af the
ing between the Soviet Union! war period, was pursuing a policy
and the West, having become: unacceptable not only to Mac-
convinced on a basis of_officis!: jean, but also to many others.
Up to that moment the paths
of our lives were alike.
Later the career of each of us
followed @ different course. For
this reason it will be better to
|
1
|_Seseribe ihem separataly_.._
SS
n wast Durkemeldthis tii
information which was at our
disposal of the fact that neither
the British, nor still more the
American policy at that time
was seriously pursuing the object.
‘The position which we oc-
cupied gave us every reason 0 war in Spain and the Munich, Foreign Office official, nor when
think such mutual understand,
14g absolutely necessary if w!
ish to -preserve peace.
lWe had every reason for com}
ing to the conclusion that suc!
mutual understanding was the
object of Soviet policy.
Feared for Future
We had every possibility to
know the plans of a smal) but
powerful group of. men who op-
posed the achievement of such
mutual understanding and for
this resson we had every
grounds to fear these plans.
When we were in Cambridge;
we were both Communists. We)
ceased our political activities,’
not because we were to any ex-
tent not in agreement with
Marxist analysis of the situation:
which we still observe at the
Present moment, but because as
has now become clear to us, we,
wrongiy presumed that being in,
the service of the state we could
more than anywhere else put
into practice our {deals.
Wrongful Interpretation of our
actions—the meed to cease po-
Utter) ‘activities when entering
the service of the state—appar-
ently led to the statement of the,
Foreign Office tyat the Foreign
,
\
Office presumes that we had bej understanding between East and
come Soviet ents in Cam
bridge,
The’ Foreign’ Office‘ can, 0:
\ course, presume anything
wishes, But what mattess-tctha{
we, Not the Foreign Office, ar
competent in this question.
<i
:
DP kb eoieie
|
joffice and at his home were being
He was by no means the only |
one in the Foreign Office to ex-:
press before the war his negative!
attitude toward Britain's foreign’
policy, particularly as regards,
Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the civil)
events,
However, after the war he
found himself more and more
alone.
It was becoming increasingly
difficult to find anyone to think
of something else than the Com-
munist menace, to understand
he senselessness and danger of
American policy in the Far East
and Europe.
To remain further in the dip-
lomatic service was becoming
impossible. In May, 1951, there
were clear signs that whatever
plans he may have been making
for his future, the Foreign Office
and the Security organs had
their own intentions as regards
im.
The telephones both in his
used as microphones for listen-
ing in. Counteresplonage agents
followed him wherever he went,’
and one of his colleagues was
sent to him. for-provocative pur-
poses. *
Decided to Leave
For this reason, Maclean de-
cided to go to the Soviet Union
in order to contribute from
there, to the best of his ability,
ito the achievements of mutual
Cc
‘The latter not oniy agreed |
orgaHize—everything raters
for departure, but he himself;
‘also took the decision to leave
Britain. .
This jourhey. was too danger-
jous for Mrs. Maclean, who was
expecting baby.
She. arrived with her children,
in the Soviet Union in 1953,
As regards Burgess, having de-'
. jeided to leave Cambridge, he
Joined the BBC. Later, he was
\offered other posts. Having
|agreed to this, he worked at
ifirst in one of the departments|
of the British Secrek¥—Zsrise,!
|
H
—————ooo
and later in the Foreign Office.
iné ipa-
thized with Soviet policy.
At the same time, he was in-;
creasingly alarmed by the post-
war character of Anglo-Ameri-
policy.
No Effort for Peace
The greatest anxiety was:
caused by the fact that at first
no modus vivendi was reached
between East and West and Ia-
ter on no attempts were made
to reach it,
Neither when he was working,
in the BBC, when ‘he was a
he was connected with the
‘Secret Service or counter espi-
onage—M, I. 5—did he make a
secret with his friends or col-
leagues of his views or of the
fact that he fad been a Com-!
munist. -
His views at the time he held
the aforementioned posts clearly
xefute the assertion that he was
a Soviet agent. -
This explanation of the views!
of Burgess is necessary to un-
derstand the circumstances
which arose a week or so after
his return to London from
Washington in 1951,
He visited MacLean as the,
jAmerican department of the!
'Foreign Office.
| During this meeting they dis-
covered that thelr knowledge;
and appreciation of the political
situation and the danger of war
were identical. \
Further Events 1
~ The further course of events]]”
was determined by the following
circumstances.
Burgess, who already = few
months previously had started |
looking for other work, intend-
ing to leave the diplomatic serv-
country while under police sur-
veillance was Solved by a meet-
ing with Burgess who had just
later and independently of Bur-
The difficulty of leaving thegess’ decision. had decided not
lice, was faced with the fact that
the Foreign Office, somawhat
employ him any longer in the!
iptomatic service.
There can be no doubt that
returned to London from Wash-no agent would have left the
Mr. Tplson Ze
Msecrate-
Fis Boar
a4 elmo ze
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
It. Sizoo
“ Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
However, at the dectasive mo-(/
iy ss Nad Geuvia av to
whether he wished or could do!
work for which he was striving,
without acting against bis own'
jconscience, . H
For this reason, when Mac-!
lean told Burgess that he him-
self had decided no tonger to
work for the Foreign ‘Office and
its policy, and also proposed that!
both of them should go°to the”
USSR, {¢ was not dificult for
Burgess te-agree'to this,"
Only there, it seemed to them, |
was & possibility to put into
Practice in one form on another}
the convictions which they had
always held, i
Our life in the Soviet Union’
has convinced us that we took,
that time the correct decisio
We are handing out this stat¢-;
lent for publication in the pres| -|
(Signed) Donald Maclean, Gi
Urges.
ep
Wash. Post and
Times Herald
Wash. News
Wash, Star A=?
N. Y. Herald —-_-—
Tribune
N. Y. Mirror
N.Y. Daily News -—_
Daily Worker
The Worker
New Leader —_____
ington, where he was_ocospying Fo! Office on his own iniisa.
‘a™post_t™ the British Embassy tive.” ot
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