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Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 14

85 pages · May 23, 2026 · Broad topic: Intelligence Operations · Topic: Cambridge Five Spy Ring · 85 pages OCR'd
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Text of Statement Issued: By Burgess and Maclean Dig (hbeseroo} t a . 11 (—Text of a statempnDissued in - Mossou fodgt Fy patastng British diplomats. Guy-Burgess and ' Donald” Mai , as brbatecctby Moscow Radio/\—— j It Beenie s doubts and | fe nelther of us have ever speculation our present) bec agents. whereabouts and our former ac- tivity may.represent a small but significant factor which has hitherto been used and may again be used by opponents of| Anglo-Soviet understanding. In view of these considerations ‘ —— int it better to publish! 4s regards Maclea: this statement : in the-aifclal diplostatic tefvice! “We arrived in the Soviet Union) in London and Patis, Washing- In order to-make our contribu-| ton and Cairo from 1935 to 1951, tion to @ policy almed at achiev-| thus being part of the: machine ing greater mutual understand-| which, with the exception af the ing between the Soviet Union! war period, was pursuing a policy and the West, having become: unacceptable not only to Mac- convinced on a basis of_officis!: jean, but also to many others. Up to that moment the paths of our lives were alike. Later the career of each of us followed @ different course. For this reason it will be better to | 1 |_Seseribe ihem separataly_.._ SS n wast Durkemeldthis tii information which was at our disposal of the fact that neither the British, nor still more the American policy at that time was seriously pursuing the object. ‘The position which we oc- cupied gave us every reason 0 war in Spain and the Munich, Foreign Office official, nor when think such mutual understand, 14g absolutely necessary if w! ish to -preserve peace. lWe had every reason for com} ing to the conclusion that suc! mutual understanding was the object of Soviet policy. Feared for Future We had every possibility to know the plans of a smal) but powerful group of. men who op- posed the achievement of such mutual understanding and for this resson we had every grounds to fear these plans. When we were in Cambridge; we were both Communists. We) ceased our political activities,’ not because we were to any ex- tent not in agreement with Marxist analysis of the situation: which we still observe at the Present moment, but because as has now become clear to us, we, wrongiy presumed that being in, the service of the state we could more than anywhere else put into practice our {deals. Wrongful Interpretation of our actions—the meed to cease po- Utter) ‘activities when entering the service of the state—appar- ently led to the statement of the, Foreign Office tyat the Foreign , \ Office presumes that we had bej understanding between East and come Soviet ents in Cam bridge, The’ Foreign’ Office‘ can, 0: \ course, presume anything wishes, But what mattess-tctha{ we, Not the Foreign Office, ar competent in this question. <i : DP kb eoieie | joffice and at his home were being He was by no means the only | one in the Foreign Office to ex-: press before the war his negative! attitude toward Britain's foreign’ policy, particularly as regards, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), the civil) events, However, after the war he found himself more and more alone. It was becoming increasingly difficult to find anyone to think of something else than the Com- munist menace, to understand he senselessness and danger of American policy in the Far East and Europe. To remain further in the dip- lomatic service was becoming impossible. In May, 1951, there were clear signs that whatever plans he may have been making for his future, the Foreign Office and the Security organs had their own intentions as regards im. The telephones both in his used as microphones for listen- ing in. Counteresplonage agents followed him wherever he went,’ and one of his colleagues was sent to him. for-provocative pur- poses. * Decided to Leave For this reason, Maclean de- cided to go to the Soviet Union in order to contribute from there, to the best of his ability, ito the achievements of mutual Cc ‘The latter not oniy agreed | orgaHize—everything raters for departure, but he himself; ‘also took the decision to leave Britain. . This jourhey. was too danger- jous for Mrs. Maclean, who was expecting baby. She. arrived with her children, in the Soviet Union in 1953, As regards Burgess, having de-' . jeided to leave Cambridge, he Joined the BBC. Later, he was \offered other posts. Having |agreed to this, he worked at ifirst in one of the departments| of the British Secrek¥—Zsrise,! | H —————ooo and later in the Foreign Office. iné ipa- thized with Soviet policy. At the same time, he was in-; creasingly alarmed by the post- war character of Anglo-Ameri- policy. No Effort for Peace The greatest anxiety was: caused by the fact that at first no modus vivendi was reached between East and West and Ia- ter on no attempts were made to reach it, Neither when he was working, in the BBC, when ‘he was a he was connected with the ‘Secret Service or counter espi- onage—M, I. 5—did he make a secret with his friends or col- leagues of his views or of the fact that he fad been a Com-! munist. - His views at the time he held the aforementioned posts clearly xefute the assertion that he was a Soviet agent. - This explanation of the views! of Burgess is necessary to un- derstand the circumstances which arose a week or so after his return to London from Washington in 1951, He visited MacLean as the, jAmerican department of the! 'Foreign Office. | During this meeting they dis- covered that thelr knowledge; and appreciation of the political situation and the danger of war were identical. \ Further Events 1 ~ The further course of events]]” was determined by the following circumstances. Burgess, who already = few months previously had started | looking for other work, intend- ing to leave the diplomatic serv- country while under police sur- veillance was Solved by a meet- ing with Burgess who had just later and independently of Bur- The difficulty of leaving thegess’ decision. had decided not lice, was faced with the fact that the Foreign Office, somawhat employ him any longer in the! iptomatic service. There can be no doubt that returned to London from Wash-no agent would have left the Mr. Tplson Ze Msecrate- Fis Boar a4 elmo ze Mr. Mason Mr. Mohr Mr. Parsons Mr. Rosen Mr. Tamm It. Sizoo “ Mr. Winterrowd Tele. Room Mr. Holloman Miss Gandy However, at the dectasive mo-(/ iy ss Nad Geuvia av to whether he wished or could do! work for which he was striving, without acting against bis own' jconscience, . H For this reason, when Mac-! lean told Burgess that he him- self had decided no tonger to work for the Foreign ‘Office and its policy, and also proposed that! both of them should go°to the” USSR, {¢ was not dificult for Burgess te-agree'to this," Only there, it seemed to them, | was & possibility to put into Practice in one form on another} the convictions which they had always held, i Our life in the Soviet Union’ has convinced us that we took, that time the correct decisio We are handing out this stat¢-; lent for publication in the pres| -| (Signed) Donald Maclean, Gi Urges. ep Wash. Post and Times Herald Wash. News Wash, Star A=? N. Y. Herald —-_-— Tribune N. Y. Mirror N.Y. Daily News -—_ Daily Worker The Worker New Leader —_____ ington, where he was_ocospying Fo! Office on his own iniisa. ‘a™post_t™ the British Embassy tive.” ot
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