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Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 14
Page 80
80 / 85
é
. ayier 5 minutes by standing up;
Burgess and Maclean
Tell ll of F light East’
“i
freely with
Gertespondents, but dodged!
lvery question we put to them,
d ‘refused to let us read the
atement until they had Jeft.:
Onarrival they had produced |
Fhe copies of the statement
rom a brown leather. dispatch
tase, which Burgess carried.
They said they had asked Tass
to-arrange a meeting “because
ye wanted to make a state-
ent.”
Poth wage neat. pin-striped
auits apBarently of English!
i make, smoked a cheap brand
f Russian clgarets and declined:
feast clgarel off ere @ to
} They broke off the interview |
at the table at which they sat!
and st Shaking hands with the
FOutside the hotel, they,
Paused for a moment before
erossing Gorky street, Moscow's
main thoroughfare, and chatted
with me as I asked whether,
they had any message to send
to relatives. *
‘Burgess, who seemed as con-
fident as Maclean was-ill at
ease, repled:: ---~ -
T would like to send a mes-
sige to my mother, I think of,
her constantly, and I hope to’
write to her as soon as I can.”
~Maclean, asked if he also had
almessage, answered: “I will be
communicating myself.”
“Then, they set of on font
through the fog covering Mos-
ot in the direction of a build-
ing occupied by the Soviet Gov-
ernment -Central Administra-
ton.,' .
‘tFottowing is the text of the
Burgess-Maclean statement, os,
transmitted by Associated Press
and as’ broadcast by Moscow
oe a
““It seems to us doubts and!
speculation as to our present!
whereabouts and our former ac-
tivity may rgpresent a small
but ‘significa®t factor whith
has hitherté been used and may
again be us by opponents of
Angio-Soviet ‘understanding.
ui “In view, of ret consis
ons, we thought er,
publish hrs. statenienb——._.
bs “We | awe grtived tn‘
inlortr—srder to make use| lexpress before the war his neg-
Uatribution to a policy aimed
et achieving greater mutua}
understanding between the So-|
yiet Union and the West, hav-
Ing become convinced on the
Wasis of official information
which was at our disposal of
the fact that neither the British,
por still more ,the American
policy at that time was serious-
pursuing this object. 7
“The position which we -oc-|
furied gave us every reason to}
hink such a mutual under-
standing. absolutely necessary,
Jé we wish to preserve peace,’
Endorsed Red Polley . .<:
* “We had every reason for
toming to the conclusion that
fre mutual understanding was
le object of Soviet policy,
1 “We had every possibility to
know the plans of a small but}!
- powerful group of men who op-
sed the achievement of such.
fhis reason we
grounds to fear these plans.
2 “When we were in Cam-
bridge, we were both Commu-
Dists—we ceased our political
activities, not because we were
to any extent not in agreement
h Marxist analysis of the
uation which we still observe
at the present moment, but be-
gas as has now become clear
we wrongly presumed
that t being in the service of the
state, we could more than any-
Where else put into practice our
Heals.
+ “Wrongful interpretation of
our actions—the need to cease:
litical activities when enter-
ig the service of the state— i
apparently led to the statement!
of the Foreign Office that the,
Forelgn Office presumes that
we had become Soviet agents
Jn Cambridge.
*-“The Forefgn Office can,-of
sourse, presume anything it
wishes. But what matters is
that we, not the Foreign office,
pre competent in this ‘question.
1 “We, neither of us have ever}
‘been Soviet agents,
“Up to that moment the paths
ot our lives were alike.
be pater. the career of each of:
lus followed a different course.
we this reason It wi lbs eu be better
jesttTbe them sapaately ely.
FEB 12 1956:
mutual understanding and for}*
had every,
«<p regards Awtegards Maclea ‘as|\postwar character of Anglo- |
ihn jhe official diplot | wetv-|{American policy.‘
in London and P. Jash-|| “The. greatest anxiety was,
‘ton and Cairo from 1935 to
1951, thus being part of the
imachine which, with the ex-
feeption of the war period, was
ersuing a policy unacceptable
ot iy to Maclean but also to’
others.» '
“He was by no means the only
ne in the Foreign Office to
lative attitude toward Britain's
foreign policy, particularly as
regards Abyssinia (Ethiopia),
civil war in Spain and the
Munich events.
“However, after the war he
found himself more and more
alone.
“It was becoming increasjng-
ly difficult to find anyone to
think of something else than
the Communist menace, to un-'
{derstand the senselessness and
{danger of American policy. in
the Far East and Europe.
“To remain further in the
iplomatic service was becom-
‘ing impossible. In May, 1951,
there were clear signs that
{whatever plans he may have
been making for his future, the!
} Foreign Office and the secu-|
trity, organs had their own in-
+ tentions in regard tp him,
} [ “The telephones “both in his
Igttice and at his home, wer
eing used as microphones f
stening in. Counterespiona;
gents followed him where:
‘ba went, and one of his co!
leagues was sent to him for pro-
vocative purposes.
“For this reason, Mclean |de-|
cided to go to the Soviet Urfion
inforder to contribute fom
thdre, to the best of his ability,
to [he achievements of mutual
understanding between East
and West.
Meeting With Burgess
“The difficulty of leaving the
scountry while under police sur-
jveillancé was solved by a meet-
jing with Burgess who had just
returned to London from Wash-!
jington, where he was occupying,
a post in:the British Embassy.
“The latter not only agreed to |
organize everything necessary ;
for departure, but he himself!
also took the decision to leave
Britain.
“This journey was too danger-!
ous for Mrs. Maclean, who awas
expecting a baby.
“She arrived with her chil-
ren in the Soviet Union \n’
1953, :
“As regards Burgess, having;
decided to leave Cambridge, he
joined the BBC. Later, he was!
offered other posts. Having
agreed to this, he worked at
~~ **_ifirst in one of the departments
.of the British secret service, and.
later in the Foreign Office.
ing_al} this time, he sympa-
ized with Soviet
~ coking for other work, intend|'
caused by: the fact that at first:
ino: modus vivendi was reached;
between East and. West and:
later no” attempts were made
ito re: ity
“Neither when he was work-|
ing in the BBC, when he was}
a Foreign Oftice official, nor
when he was connected ‘with
the secret 31 oF ounce
espionage—M.] LS -éd ¢ make
a secret with his” friends or;
colleagues of his-views, or of
the fact that he bad been a
Communist. 772"
Spy Charge Reported - :
“His views at the time he!
held the aforementioned posts
clearly refute the assertion that’
he was a Soviet agent.
“This explanation of the
views of Burgess is necessary
to understand the circum-
stances which arose a week or
so after his return to London
from Washington in 1951. |
| “He visited Maclean as the
head of the American Depart-
ment of the Foreign Office,
“During this mecting they!
discovered that their knowledge
and appreciation of. the politi-
cal situation and the danger of!
war_were-identical.” oo
“The further course of events
was determined by the follow-
ing circumstances:
“Burgess, who already a fe
onths previously had sta:
i to leave the diplomatid:
service, was faced with the fac!
that the Foreign Office, some-|
what later and independently of!
Burgess’ decision, had decided
not to employ him any longer!
‘in the diplomatic service. +
' “There can be-no doubt that
no agent would have left the’
Foreign Office on his own)
initiative.
“However, a the decisive
moment, Burgess had doubts as’
to whether he wished or could)
do work for which he was striv-’
ing, without acting against his
‘own conscience. .
“For this reason, when Mac-)
lean told Burgess that he him-,
self had decided no longer to!
work fo~ the Foreign Office and”
its policy, and also proposed
that both of them shonld go to
the U.S. S. R., it was not dif-,
cult for Burgess to agree to this.'
“Only there, it seemed to;
them, was there a possibility to!
put into practies. in one form or!
another the convictions which)
they had always held.
“Our life in the Soviet Union
has convinced us that we took
at tt that time the correct deci-
:-“We are handing out this!
statement for publication in the)
press.
i
P ‘Signed) “Donata Maclean, |
Guy Burgess.” _
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