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é KIM PHILBY continued How'd they get Burgess out? Three traffic tickets did it Affair. There was already evidence that the Foreign Office had been pene treted Both Krivitsky and Volkort {Soves defectors) had said 40. There a5, of course. nothing 10 auggest that the three sources referred 10 the same man There ts sil! no basis for that supposition Bur if the assump- thor had been made. if ip parucular the Krisitshy material had been stud- ie im relation 10 tbe Washington deak, # search among the diplomats would have started without oss of ume — perhaps even before } appeared on the scene Bur anocher feature of S the case was even more puzzling} must contes to have enjoyed a great advantage in that 1 was pretty certain from the beginning who was an volved But even discount ing that advantage, it me quire ob. vious Isom the nature of the reports that we were rot dealing with the pets agen' emptying waste Paper baskets and snatch- Ing the odd carbon, Some fof the seports dealt with political problems of some complexity There could bbe no rea) doubt the we ‘were dealing wath # man of staigre The reluctance to iniate inquiries along these lines can only be atribured wa genuine ‘merits! block which stub. bbornls resisied the belie that respecied members of the Establishment could 0 such things The exis fence of such a block was amph borne our by ‘that lowed the di Maclea and Burgess — land. for that matier. my own Explananons of ex the obssous stonple tru Yer J knew qi thy brearte could not go on for ever Once investigation of the diplomats saried, 1 would feriainly yield the right answer, sooner or Ia The grea question How soon” How late? From discussion with my Friends a) meetings ou side Washingion. «wo main points emerged Firs, 1! was essential fo rescue Maclean before the net ‘closed on him That was accepted as an axiom) No question wat raused ‘thout his future pocentia! to the Soviet sn im the event of his escape. It fe enough that he was an ‘Genera! Krisitshy, a Red Army inte) gehce Ollie” deftcled 10, the Wer in 1999, wroie x hook called 2 Chose Fer om and Tater when living tn the US. mimirieg suicude VotLow seme » RuNins agent who tried to defect 10. the Weee Phulty "hardieg the eane Volkor never nde it old comrade Some readers. prisoners ‘of prevadice. may fing this hard to eallow 1 do not ash them to do 50. But they cannot blame me if they ‘tuffer “unpleasant shocks. in future eases Second. it was desirable that Maclean should stay in his pos! as Jong as possible After his dep 8 was said Dlandly that he was “only” head of the American Department of But there were two further compl.- cations 1 had been tent 10 the United for w two-year tour of duty. and T could therefore expect to be repinced in the autumn of 1951. 1 had no idea ‘what_my next posting would be: it could easily have heen Cairo or Sings- ore. far out of touch with the Mac- ean case Groping in parus! darkness BS we were, if seemed safent 10 gel Hollandia -the Dutch pipe _ that’s kind to every toi the Foreign Office, and thus had little sccess 40 high-grade information. But 4H in nomense 10 euppene thal a ree- Jute and experienced operator oecupy. ing 4 senior post in the Foreign Ottice ean have access only Wo the papers thet are placed on his desk in the ordinary “courne of duty 1 have already shown that T gained access 10 the files of Briish agents in the Soviet Union when I was supposed. to be chivvying Germans in Spain Tn shor, ‘our duly a0 10 get Maclean to safety, bur not hefore s'was necessary Maclean away by the middie of 1951 the lates. The second complication rove from Burgews pouition He was emphatically oot @1 home in the Foreign Office, for which he had neither the right Cempe Fight personainy. He ng for some time of getting oul. and hhad one or two irons in the fire an Fleet Sureet As a result, his work for the Foreign Office had suffered 46 much 40 that it Jooked like # close thing between resignation and. dis -missal from his post In any case, he — As anxious to get back to Ehglad In somebody's mind — 1 do not know whose — the two ideas merged Burgess return to London and the rescue of Maclean MW Burgess re tuned to London from the’ Britich Embassy in Washingion. it seemed ‘aatuzal that be should call on tbe hea) of the “American Departmen. He would be well placed to se! the ball roling for the rescue operation 1: would have been possible for him 10 have resigned in Washington. and returned to London without fuss. But it might have looked w bit = 08d Hf he had pone back Yoluntarity short belore the disappearance of Mat lean. Matters had to be so arranged that he was vent back, wily-nilly was the sort of projec: to which Burgess delight ‘e8. and he brought i: of! in the simplest possible way. Three times im one ay be was booked for speeding in the State of ‘Virginia, and the governor reacied just as we had hoped. He sent + tunovs Protest to the State De ariment agains this fia: Brant abuse of dipiomane Privilege, which was then brought to the antention of the ambassador Wsthin a feu days. Burgess was re rettulls informed that he Would have to jeave As soon as the possiil of Burgess helping in the rescue operation emerged from our disc. won. greal attention was aid 10 my awn position Despite all precaubon. Burgess might be seen with Maclean, and inquiry into hhis activity might lead 10 doubts about me. There seemed very litle that ‘sould be done about it, bur 1 occurred to me that | could help ta divert sus pron by making & pos: we contribution te the solution of the Briush Ern- assy case Hitherto. I had lain Jom. lecung the FBI and MIS do what they ‘could Now that the rescue plan mas T should not give the in- ‘vesuganion a nudge in the ight direction To that end. I wrote & Head OF. mF our Tame i exhaustive anvesip tions of the embass) me. fats J recalied the statements of Krivisky 10 the best of my ahi from memory. -He had said that the ‘Soviet intelligence for Wesiern Europe baad reervited 1m the middle. Guise. "young man who had gone ino the Foreign Office He was of good farm ity. and hag been educated at Eton and Oxford He was an ideaiist Working without payment. T suggested that these di such as they were, should he matched against the records of diplomats stationed in Washington between the relevant dates in 1948-28