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Cambridge Five Spy Ring — Part 32
Page 83
83 / 121
whey
keep an eye on him. He seemed C)
py that there was someone else wiio
was ready to share the responsi-
bility.
In the licht of what was to come,
my decisivn to fall in with Burgess’
suggestion iooks like a bad mistake.
Thave indeed given it much thought
in the past fifteen years. It will not
do to plead that the twist events
were to take a few months later
were utterly unforeseeable; security
precautions are designed to give
protection from the unforeseeable.
_ But, on reflection, I think that my
decision to accommodate Burgess
. speeded by a few, weeks at most the
» focussing of the spotlight on me.
It also lent vigour to the letter
which Bedell-Smith sent the Chief
insisting on my removal from the
scene. It may even have been lucky
_ that guspicion fell on me premature-
ly, in the sense that it crystallised
“before the evidence was strong
enough to bring me to court.
Burgess’ arrival raised an issue
that I could not decide by myself.
Should he or should he not be let
into the secret of the British Em-
bassy source which was still under
investigation? The decision to ini-
tiate him was taken after I had
made two lone motor trips to points
outside Washington. I was told that
the balance of opinion was that
Guy’s special knowledge of the prob-
Jem might be helpful. I therefore
took Guy fully into our confidence,
briefing him in the greatest detail,
and the subject remained under con-,
stant discussion between us. My dif-
ficulty ws: that 1 had only seen
Maclean tvvice, and briefly, in four-
teen years, I had no idea where he
lived, how he lived, or indeed any- ''
thing et ci about his circumstances.
iv is now time to turn to the
.. to explain how it stood, and
preblemss {t involved. ‘
‘ie ¢:velopment of the affair was
Geep anxiety, It was be-
nderables, the assess-
tua: gaceswork, We had received
some dozen reports referring to the
sgurce, Who appeared in the docu-
ts under the code-name Homer,
> little progresa had been made
was still sending us reams about
thé Embassy charladies, and the
enquiry into our menial personne)
‘ was spinning itself out endlessly.
To me, this remains the most in-
explicable feature of the whole af-
fair. There was already evidence
that the Foreign Office had been
, penetrated. Both Krivitsky! and
Volkov had said so. There was, of
course, nothing to suggest that the
three sources referred to the same
man. There is still no basis for that
supposition. But if the assumption
“had heen made, if in particular the
Krivitsky material had been studied
‘in relation to the Washington leak,
a search among the diplomats would
have started without loss of time—
“perhaps wven before I appeared on
| the scene.
But another feature of the case
was even more puzzling. I must con-
“fess to,having enjoyed a great ad-
vantagein that I was pretty certain
from the beginning who was in-:
volved, But, even discounting that -
advantage, it seemed to me quite
obvious, from the nature of the re-
‘ ports, that we were not dealing with
“the petty agent emptying waste-
paper baskets and snatching the
odd carbon, Some of the reports
dealt with political problema of
some complexity, and on more than
one occasion Homer was spoken of
with respect. There could be no real
doubt that we were dealing with a |
oman of stature. The reluctance to
initiate enquiries along these lines
‘can only be attributed to a genuine
mental block which stubbornly re-
sisted the belief that respected
members of the Establishment could
do such things. The existence of
such # block was amply borne out
by the commentaries that followed
the disappearance of Maclean and
Burgess—and for that matter, my
own. Explanations of extraordinary
silliness were offered in preference
to the obvious simple truth.
Yet I knew quite well that this
bizarre situation could not go on
forever, One day,.any day, some-
* body in London-or Washington
* ABoviet intelligence officer Walter Kri-
, Yiteky defected to the West in 1940,
. bringing with him secret information
about identified Soviet agent in
“Britain's Foreign Offce—Ede.
'
#64 find inspiration there. Once in-
vestigation of the diplomats started,”
it would certainly yield the right |
answer sooner or Jater. The great ©
question was: how soon? how late?
From discussion with my frienda
at meetings outside Washington,
two main points emerged. First, it
‘was essential to rescue Maclean be-
fore the net closed in on him. That ~~
was accepted eas an axiom. No ques- ©
tion was raised about his future
\ potential to the Soviet Union in the
“event of his escape. It was quite _
enough that he was an old comrade.
. Some readers, prisoners of preju-
dice, may find this hard to swallow.
T do not ask them to do so. But they
cannot blame me if they suffer un-
” pleasant shocks in future cases. Sec- >.”
ond, it was desirable that Maclean
should stay in his post as long as
possible. After his departure, it was
said blandly that he was “only”
head of the American Department
of the Foreign Office, and thus had.
little access to high-grade informa-
tion. But it is nonsense to suppose
that a resolute and experienced op- ~ a
erator occupying @ senior post in
the Foreign Office can have access" |
only to the papers that are placed
‘on his desk in the ordinary course. :
of duty. I have already shown that *
I gained access to the files of Brit-
ish agents in the Soviet Union when
I was supposed to be chivvying Ger-
- Mans in Spain. In short, our duty
was to get Maclean to safety, but
* not before it was necessary.
But there were two further com-
plications. I had been sent to the
United States for a two-year tour
of duty, and I could therefore ex-
“pect to be replaced in the autumn
. of 1951. I had no idea what my next
_ posting would be; it could easily
have been Cairo or Singapore, far -
out of touch with the Maclean case. —
Groping in partial] darkness as we
were, it seemed safest to get Mac-
- lean away by the middle of 1951 at ©
the latest. The second complication
arose from Burgess’: position. He
was emphatically not at home in
. the Foreign Office, for which he
had neither the right temperament
nor the right personality. He had
been thinking for some time of get-
()iid took into bis shaving-mirroy
on
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