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1956 1957 1968 1959 1960 1961 US. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET HEAVY-BOMBER STRENGTH by the middle of 1961, ac- eording to an article by Senator Stuart Symington in The Reporter, decreased by 81 per cent between August, 1956 (bar at left), and August, 1961 (right). Senator Symington’s figores were given in percentages, rather than absolute numbers, for security reasons. PER CENT US. ESTIMATE OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL ICBM STRENGTH sinilarsy decreased, ac- cording to Senator Symington, by 96.5 per cent between December, 1959, and September, 1961. first sta_ Yow levels such as those suggested by “the Anglo-French memo- sandum of 1954: one million or at most 1.5 million men each for the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China. When the corre- spondingly limited contributions to the land forces of NATO from Great Britain, France and West Germany are taken into account, the armies of the Soviet bloc would not have the capability of overrunning Europe in a surprise land attack. The number of nuclear weapons in existence on both sides, their explosive power and the diversity of the delivery systems are so overwhelming that no small step in nuclear disarmament can have much significance. In a situation in which the U.S. has 10,000 delivery vehi- cles and a stockpile of 30,000 megatons of explosive (which is said to be increas- ing at the fastest rate in its history), a first disarmament step involving only a small percentage reduction is not worth negotiating. To justify the labor of nego- tiating any agreed reduction, and to off- set the undoubted strains and disputes that will inevitably arise from the opera- tion of any inspection and control sys- tem, the negotiated reduction must be a major one; in fact, of such magnitude as to change qualitatively the nature of the relative nuclear postures of the two int powers. The simplest big first step, and the one most consistent with realistic mili- tary considerations, is that both giant powers should reduce their nuclear forces to a very low and purely retalia- tory role. That is, each should retain only enough invulnerable long-range vehicles to attack the other's cities if it is itself at- tacked, say less than 100 ICBM’s with one-megaton war heads. This is still an enormous force, capable of killing tens of millions of people. A reduction to a level of 20 ICBM’s or Jess would be much preferable. Such a reduction would at once prevent nuclear weapons from being used by sane governments as weapons of aggression or coercion. It would not, of course, prevent them from being used by irresponsible groups who do not calculate the cost. It is only at a later stage in disarmament, when nucieat weapons are completely destroyed, that this danger will be excluded. It has al- ways been clear that the ever present danger of accidental or irresponsible war is a cogent reason for big and rapid steps in the disarmament process. Drites studies are needed of possible ways in which both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. could take such an impor-