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the Chinese the very objec which they have so far not achieved for themeely the expantion of Chi- nese power far south into the Indochina peninsula, Tn their more candid moments our leaders argue that, : as the situation may he, United States prestige in ix at stake in South Victnam and can be salvaged only by victory. Although it ie true that our prestige hae suffercd ceriouely, it doce not follow that any sort of conventional “victory” is likely or even possible. In ench circumetances prudence may dictate that avoi- dance of further humiliating defeat is the best means of “saving face.” A fundamenta) consideration is needed of just what “victory” means in the Wictnamese context. The war is not a conventional one of armics and_ battlefields. Neither is it a simple struggle of international commun- ism ve. capitalism, as come of our demagogic Jeadere assert. Nor yet is it merely the current installment of the historic struggle between imperial China and her anall neighbors, Certainly both the ideological and the imperialistic factors are involved to a degree. Basically, the Vietnamese war is a civil conflict: with i nationalistic hase. There is Jittle for foreigners to" in euch a conflict, for, short of destroying perhaps a majority of the Vietnamese people, it is unlikely that we will ever succeed in moulding o Vietnam tailored to American desires. fal and f ignoring these domestic roots of the civil war in South Vietnam. We «cem unable to realize that killing Vict- namcse people and destroying their -homes inereases rather than reduces their hostility to us. Our utter failure to grasp this obvious fact wat demonstrated by 6 aseador to ¥) former am! tnam:, Henry Cabot Lodge, when he was asked upon his return to the United States how the war would end. He said: ft will end when there aren't any more Viet Cong insur- gents. That doesn't mean they're all dead. 11 means they've derided not to be Viet Cong any more. And the reason they decide not to be Viel Cong any more is that it's tou dangerous—they're liable 10 be killed. (New York Times. June 28, 19641 Fven were cur might to prevail in South Vietnam's civil war, the presence of China, with over a quarter of the world's people. would make futile the attempt to ere- ate a stabir and peaceful Southeast Asia. Wr cannot ig- nore China's existence and ite netural intereet in any political settlement in that area. There it, of course, a schoo) of thought which views Vietnam as merety one outpost in a strategic chain of installations which the States is constructing for the purpose of meeting I Ching head-on, Vast jet facilities and supporting far surpassing conceivable requirements for ac- tions restricted only to Vietnam. are being prepared there to complement similar installations in Thailand. In thie view. Vietnam is only a rehearsal and staging area jer the reai confrontation which is yet to come. {enoring the military futility of placing such crucial installation- in a region likely to be so hostile ae to ren- der sabotage or capture by enemy forces almost incvi- table. one ir appalled by the cynicism of thir attitude as well as by the horror of ite immorality Vas Many people are becoming inercasingly restive over the sitaation, A number of our allics have attempted Yo disassociate themselves from our actions in South Vietnam. France has openly advocated neutraliain for the Indochinese states and hae accepted the fact that China must b d and dealt i ae in the area if conditions are ever to be ttabilized. Our - efforts to convince our other NATO partners to port our Victn @. have met with little eympathy. The majority o: asian nations shy away from taking a positive stand on cither side of the conflict, many of them maintaining relations with both Vietname and avoiding publie comment about the civil war. However, neighboring Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, who has had phenomena} success with a neutralist policy. has long predicted a victory for the Victnamere rebel forces. U Thant hae said that “military methods will not bring about peace in South Vietnam.” and be suggested that the Geneva agreements might profitably be revived. Hre in our country. protest against the official policy in South Vietnam has been increasing a+ news reporting from Victnam has fought itecl{ somewhat free of the stricturee imposed by the Department of Defense and as public opinion has bepun to react to the frequent contradictions and sharp reversals in the Administra- The ever-increasing magnitude of our expenditures is alto a growing caute of concern among both Adminie- tration supporters and opponents. Senator Dirk-en. in ng that the one and one-half million dollars of sid per day to South Vietn 1 won! shortly rise to 1wo million. complained that in South Vietnam itsel “We appear to have made no real progress.” Other citizen groups have expressed abhorence at our coun: try’s so completely subsidizing and dominating the economy of another nation. including paying the sal- aries of ite army. This ie indeed a type of “invicihle” colonialism which. nevertheless. becomes quite visible in Washington's outrage whenever the South Viet- namese government unilaterally decides to embark on a course of action of it: own choosing In 1963 some seventeen thousand ministers of all faiths protested to President Kennedy again-t support of the dictatorial Vietnamese governnient and the immorality of our chemical-warfare tactics against the Vietnamese people. More recently five thousand eollege and uni- Versity profecor: have prevented a petition to the State Department asking that the Vietnamese war be ended and Vietnam neutralized, In the United States Senate several Senators consis: tently protest “Sceretary McNamara’e war.” although their statements are generally not reparted by the mase wedia. Curiowly, this group represents both Senatore from Alaska. one of the states most sensitive to politi- cal developinents in the Pacific region. sencrally, Atas- ka’s Senator Grucnins recently declared: The tisne hes come te cease the useless and senseless losses of American tives in an area not essential to the security of the United States Thic is a fight which ic nol our fighl. inte whieh we should net have gotten in the first place. The lime to get out is now, before the further lose of Americsi lives. Certainly for Americans or for any forcigners 10 plan and impose a peace policy on the Vietnanere people would be as presumptuou-. as objectionable, and as foolhardy as has heen our practice of imposing # war policy on them, Satisfactory terms upon which a acttle- ment may be reached can be decided only by uUew- selves, for this is basically a civil war with myriad nuancet only dimly comprehended by outsiders. Indi cations are that the South Vietnamese people arc inter- ested primarily in ending the war. It is we who are most concerned about winning it. Unfortunately, the sucers: sion of United Stateshacked governments in South Viet nam har ruthlessly repree-ed open expression of such sentiments. and General Kihunh har even staged demon strations and attack» on the French Emba-sy E lize his people's alleged hostility ‘to a neutraliet eolu tion. Buddhist leaders have been condenmed for eu ia