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gesting neutralization anl poinicon Ines to sup: port neutralion are in exile or in pristu. Under euch conditions it is ohvions that e genuine refiection of pop ular wishes can be obtained only when the United States decides to stand acide and permit all contending factions to vie for popular support. Admittedly. if there is euficient support among the people, Communist elements might well gain control of a freely elected governent, @ fact of life which we should he prepared to face. There is, however, eonsider- able evidence that a genuinely representative South Vietnam government, whether Communist or non-Com- would opt for peace and neutrality, perhaps under international guarantece. Jt is also likely that North Vietnam, or even a Communist-oriented, unified etnam, would welcome an opportunity to minimize dependence on China. the historical “imperialist of Asia, Consolidation of the complementary econo- mies of North and South Vietnam would help to acconi- _plish this by permitting the Southern rice surplus to fill the North's rice deficit, at the same time catering to the nationalistic passion which so dominates Viet- name-e thought. The recent fissures in the Communist bloc suggest that nationalism will increasingly assert itself over monolithic Communism, and a unified or federated Vitnam would enjoy much greater mancuver- ahility to pursue such a course. The precise form which any negotiated solution might take can hardly Ie predicted at this time, Public state- tats hy the’ National Likeration Front, spokesman + bulk of the insurgent forees, concentrate on di i~ for a crssation of United States intervention in south Vietnam affairs. According to Georges Chaflard of Le Moride, the Front favors a neutral belt to include South Vietnam. Cambodia. and Laos and docs not want Sourh Vietnam to become dependent upon North Viet- nam. Other rebel elements. more closely oriented loward North Vietnam. give high priority to unification of the country. The continuing crisis in neighboring Laos cannot be seted until there has heen a@ settlement in Vietnam, nor are our tonchy rela with Cambedia likely to improve eo Jong as we obstruct efforts to bring peace along her frontier. Caribodia has twice complained to the United Nations about United States violation: of her border: first. charging that Ancricans participated in a hambing mission which killed 17 Cambodians. and second, charging us with the aerial spraying of destructive cheinicals over Cambodian territory. Such “inciaents” do u- no good but great harm; they could even serve to ignite a major conflict The idea of revonyening the 1954 Geneva Conference which ended the French-Indochinese conflict has been revived periodically, ‘most recently by U Thant (July 9, 196$,. The United States response to thie suggestion has been essentially th are apected no prot conf sence, the existing agreements uld be served hy another Considerable doubt is cast on the sincerity of thie ree aponee in view of the well known fact that some of the most blatant violations of the Geneva accords have been commitied by the United States or with its encourage- ment. Probably the most crucial term of the Geneve Cease-fire Agreement was the provision for nationwide unifying elections to be held by June 1956..The South Vietnam government, correctly afraid that it would lose such an election, if for no other reason than ite emaller popalation, adamantly refused to honor thie provision in 1956. and has steadfastly continued to refuse to per- mit unification elections despite periodic demands for these elections by the North. (Both South Vietnam and the United States hide behind the technically correct claim that they never signed the Geneva agreements.) Other provisions of the Agrecuicnt prohibited the intro- duction into Vietnam any additional military pereonnel (Article 16) or armaments (Article 17+ and forbade the establichment of new military bases (Article 18). By 1956 both North and Somth Vietnam had been found ily of violating these conditions. The massive build- up of United States forces in 2901, including the con- struction of jet air bases, was all done in knowing vio- lation of this Agreement. Another approach ha- been that of General De Gaulle. Te proposes that the United States. the Soviet Union. China, and France withdraw from Indochina and that a massive economic and technical aid program be eub- stituted for the fighting. This proposal, and indeed the entire idea of taking the Vietnamese conflict to the conference table was summarily rejected by President Johnson (press conference, July 24, 1964) within 2 hours after the General suggested it, Such haste ind cated a rigid and unthinking responte, Any course of action ix risky, but almost nonc is more risky than the one we are following. Ae mature indi- viduale Americans must realize that we cannot dictate to every corner of the globe, nor do we win respect for ourselves by brandishing our nuclear arsenal wheneve we cannot have our way- Forces in existence before the discovery of North America as wel] as forces fresh as post-World War JJ nationalism. are at work in the Vietnamese conflict. An American-backed, uwurepre- sentative governnient can temvorarily distort the rela- tive strengths of these forces, but until they are allowed to assert themselves and to find their support among & free population, unchecked guerrilla warfare, accom panied by a political instability which cannot be re ttricted to Vietnam's border, will continue to sap United States energies and prestige, to irritate United States politics, both domestic and international. to aggravate the racial polarization of the world. and to etoke the flames of World War HT. Published as an educational service by TURN TOWARD PEACE, INC. ‘Additional copies available; send orders to Cooper Station Box 401, New York, New York 10003 Single copies $15 100 copies 10 copies 1,00 500 copies $ 7.50 30.00 1000 copies $50.00 A Joint effort of some seventy voluntary organizations to find solutions to international problems which do not inve:ve threats of war or surrender of freedom or democratic values, TURN TOWARD PEACE does not itself take policy positions on specific igsues, such as the situation in Vietnam, but seeks to provide background information and to stimulate the kind of discussion necessary to find constructive answers. This paper is part of that effort. It was prepared at the request of twenty organizations which discussed and agreed upon the great need of American citizens for adequate background information on Southeast Asia and Vietnam, *