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control. Buc few political issues were in face tackled, Sooner or later some very plain talking about political issues is going to have to be dune. Non-agrcement in this area cannot be allowed to remain the mask behind which contending parties hide when they do not want to move forward on other issues. The problems of unification or division of Korea, with accompanying issues of self-determination, peaceful or violent change, reconstruction, rehabilitation and foreign intermed- dling, cannot forever be treated as ghosts—non-existent if you refuse to admit their existence. The position of the Chinese Peoples Republic must also be faced, and until faced it will remain a persistent international issuc. Shall one or both gov- ernments be accredited to the United Nations? Over what territory? Who shall sie on the Security Council, permanendy or temporarily? What shall be the relation of Formosa? What reassurances will Le demanded against outward aggression or inward overthrow? What of China’s action in Korea? It can- not be too often emphasized that there is no one single solution of these controversies; there can only be continued negotiation with hundreds of potential alternatives; and out of sincere nego= tiation can emerge a solution which will gain general acceptance. The same must be said for settlement of political issues as . to Japan, Germany, Austria, Africa and the Middle East. And it is becoming more and more widely recognized that each of these problems is more aggravated as it becomes linked to mili- tary policy—to NATO, to strategic bases, to rearming Ger- many and Japan and the nations of Eastern Europe. The posi- tion of many, until recently, has been that these issues must be settled before disarmament and like action could be attempted. Bur at Paris in 1951-52 there began to develop a somewhat more realistic attitude—realistic in recognizing how armaments complicate the issues—that none of these settlements, with che possible exception of Korea, need or should precede coming to agreement on disarmament. Whichever way we turn, we are aware chat the major problems facing the United Nations are bound up with and rendered more insoluble by armaments. It is for this as well as for religious and moral reasons that we believe mankind's next step is to disarm, and that the time for disarmament to begin is NOW. END 48 ARMED STRENGTH AND EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES* . 1950-5t Datense Military Expenditure Personnel Cin milion) UNITED KINGDOM ase 426,000 30 Ua aremegemm —B25.530 + 217 FRANCE 9,801 ITALY BENELUX PORTUGAL kaa NORWAY a r DENMARK ARMED FORCES OF EASTERN EUROPE ** SOVIET UNION 4,009,000 *¥* RUMANIA | se asaetes~ | POLAND |. sctasanie CZECHOSLOVAKIA L< Rinis | HUNGARY | 0 BULGARIA =3 + Fran Mattal Secatty Act of 1951, Re fom Armed Servicer on Hh Ke #113 * Fron “Soviet Surength and. Weskows: ‘April 1911, pt, S97 From ate Information on Implemestution of the North Allan Commi : Relations, U. 5, Senate, February 15, 495). ’ or Aaathc Treaty, Mice on Forcn 650 409 46 m 48 of he Commits on reign Relasioos and he Comittee 37, 151 Sax Iie Concributivn,” in Woare Arrains (Lomnlon)