◆ SpookStack

to critical review and evaluations in the light of scientific, military and political developments of the past five years. Inspection of Armaments That inspection is an essential feature of any practicable plan for disarmament is admitted by all. Spokesmen for both Ameri- can and Soviet blocs have agreed on this from the start. The problem is not whecher there should be inspection, but rather what shall be its nature, frequency and scope. ‘The United Nations Majority Plan provided that an incer- national authority should carry on inspection of atomic facili- ties.concurrently with the exercise of its managerial functions. Under this plan, atomic armaments of the nations would be policed by the managerial staff of the international authority with the aid of a corps of stationary and roving inspectors. However, the exact relationship between the atomic inspection procedures of the international authority and inspection for control of conventional arms has never been discussed. This plan of inspection was rejected by Soviet spokesmen as a part of the international management plan for the control of atomic facilities, because they thought that it invaded sov- ereignty and interfered unnecessarily with domestic affairs. Instead, they preferred national ownership of atomic facilities subject to inspections, both “periodic” (as frequently as the control agency decided) and “special” (whenever charges of violationis were submicted). Because of che suspicions that exist and the closed character of the Soviet state, it has been questioned whether these types of inspection would provide adequate protection. Before 1948 it was agreed that a majority decision by the control organ would be binding on all, with no right of “vero.” Later, additional agreement was reached that che control organ should decide the times and places of inspection. Finally, at Paris during the winter of 1951-52, Mr. Andrei Vyshinski modified Soviet proposals to agree that inspection should be “permanent” and on “a continuing basis,” providing it did not “interfere in the domestic affairs of states.” In clarifying these modifications, Mr. Vyshinski explained that he accepred “permanent inspection on 2 continuing basis” in the sense thac once it began it would not end, but not in the 20 sense that i¢ would proceed from international ownership or that inspectors might be srationcd permanently at key points. He also declared once more that inspection of atomic energy establishments would include (1) auditing of accounts, (2) checking stockpiles of atomic caw materials and scmi- finished products, (3) checking whether regulations govern- ing technological control were respected, (4) requesting data on the production of atomic energy, (5) collecting informa~ tion on atomic products, and (6) carrying out inspections, should the regulation on the prohibition of acomic weapons be broken. When asked what was meane when he said the control organ should not be entitled to interfere in the domes- tic affairs of states, Mr. Vyshinski explained that this meant exactly the same as Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter, which reads: Nothing contained in the present Charter shall au- thorize the United Nations co intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to sectlement under the present Charter; bur this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VIL, Spokesmen for the American bloc have not expressed themselves fully on Me, Vyshinski’s “clarifications.” As long as they insist on international ownership, the Soviet plan will be unacceptable. However, if they should concede national ownership, Mr. Vyshinski’s proposals might serve as a starting point for the elaboration of an adequate system based on inspection rather than international ownership and manage- menz of atomic facilities. Ic should be noted, however, that limits on the range of inspection perhaps are more important than its periodicity. The solution of these basic differences appeared somewhat more hopeful in the discussions at the 1951 Paris Assembly of conventional arms and armed forces. Sovier spokesmen indi- cated willingness to accept “permanent inspection on a con- tinuing basis” for conventional armaments and armed forces, as well as for atomic facilities. This concession leaves little substance to their insistence on restricting the scope of atomic 2)