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inspection to “declared” facilities. If this type of inspection were adequate for the discovery and inspection of all bases, forces, installations, productive facilities, materials and supplies relating to conventional arms and armed forces, it is difficult to imagine how clandestine atomic production could evade detection. Establishing a Schedule Having at firse a monopoly and for Arms Reduction later presumably a clear superior- ity in atomic weapons, the United States advanced plans intended to allow itsclf freedom ro use, possess, and continue manufacturing atomic materials and weapons until a “foolproof” control system is in operation. This policy would involve a procedure beginning with a census of armaments and armed forces, disclosing first the least sensi- tive and gradually the more sensitive data, followed by careful verification by international inspectors. Finally, with atomic and other weapons disclosed and verified and a control organ successfully in operation, the ban on atomic weapons would go into effect. Soviet spokesmen, replying to this “safe” approach, have variously accused the United States of “stalling,” of playing a trick, of demanding the impossible, of wanting the Soviet Union to surrender the strategic advantages of the “iron cur- tain” without any guarantce that atomic secrets would ulti- mately be disclosed or atomic weapons banned, and of hiding a determination to contro} world events behind platitudes. The Soviet Union has vigorously demanded that atomic weapons be banned immediately and unconditionally. Then fater or simul- tancously it would have the United Nations establish the con- trols necessary to ensure compliance with the ban Spokesmen of the western powers have accused the Soviet Union of insisting on the ban first only because it would weaken the West, leave the Sovict Union relatively stronger, and facilitate Russian expansion. If prohibition were first pro- claimed, it is claimed thae western nations would be left wich- out guarantees that che Soviet Union would ever agree to the types of control and cooperation required to insure compli- ance and confidence, This controversy was somewhat clarified and modified during the recent session of the General Assembly. American 22 spokesmen—without yielding their basic demand for a slow, cautious and “safe” approach—indicated for the first time a willingness to disclose atomic armaments in a census and have them verified. Announcing this, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said: 1 wish to stress and say as vigorously 2s 1 can that che proposals of the United States do include in stages disclosure and verification of atomic armaments. That again is a change in the position of the United States. Before, we had taken the position chat there could be no disclosure until the whole system of control had been set up. We are now changing our position and we are changing ic in the hope that thar change may enable the United Nations... to make progress, successful progress, toward a reduction in armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the disclosure and verification of all armaments of all sorts. The Secretary went on to emphasize that insistence upon pro- ceeding by stages was not a “trick,” as Soviet spokesmen had alleged, and that «+ © Progression from one stage to another should be an administrative matcer within the contro! of the commission controlling and administering the dis- armament agreement. In other words, it should not be a political decision to be made by states with re- sceve power in the states to make that decision. But, the agreement should be contained in che document itself that when the commission is satisfied that a stage has been successfully completed, then as an adminis- trative decision the commmissivn should proceed to the next step. That, perhaps in part, would meet che difficuley which has been suggested, The United States indicated an even more flexible posi- tion in Secretary Acheson's statement that there were two ways in which the new commission might proceed—(1) estab- lish a system of disclosure and verification first, to be followed by limitation of armaments generally and prohibition of atomic ~ weapons; or (2) “to do all of this at one time.” It is signifi- 23