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‘ A LETTER TO AMERICAN by CHARLES A. LINDBEBGH This powerful article by Col. Charles A. Lindbergh was published recently in a national magazine. It is a stirring appeal to the American people to stop, look and listen as they stand on the threshold of one of the greatest decisions in one of the greatest crises in American history. ¢ ADDRESS this letter to every men and women in America who is oppescd to our country’s entry into the European war. I write because we are being led toward that war with ever-increasing rapidity, and by every conceivable subter- fuge. While our Jeaders have shouted for peace, they have constantly directed us toward war, until even now we are seriously involved. I write to ask your immediate aid in maintaining the independent American des- tiny our forefathers established. I write to warn you that the men who entice us on to war have no more idea of how that war can be won than the governments of France and England had when they declared war on Germany. The interventionists call on us to fight, and then their responsibility ends. They offer no feasible plan for victory. The situation in America today is in the years prior to this war. There, as here, people Jet their emotions get the better of their judgment; and they had the same unwillingness to face realities, Both coun- tries had refused to take part in a Euro- justment while there was still to make the sacrifice that was essential for adequate rearmament. They, too, had cul- tivated the philosophy that it was necessary to defend someone else in order to defend themselves. How they could defend anyone else if they were unable to defend them- selves, they apparently did not consider any sare we ae vousidering wduy. lure is now obvious, and stands out clearly before us. The imposition of “sanctions” did not save Abyssinia; but it threw Italy into the arms of Germany and sowed the seeds for the Axis. The threat of war by England and France did not save Poland; but it forced Germany and Russia into an’alliance and precipitated a disastrous war. Adjustments that should have been made in peace snd moderation were finally brought by war and resulted in immodera- tion. The failure to face realities in peace brought the curse of war on Europe. The failure to face the realities of war brought defeat to France and devastation to England. When the last war ended, the victor‘ous Allies had two courses open to them. They could either hi i ny back onto her feet elt. 5 or they could have kept her in a weskened condition by the use of military force. But they followed neither of these policies. Eng- land and France wavered back and forth between the two, while the United States withdrew her armies and her politics to the Western Hemisphere—avowediy forever. _ During the years immediately succeeding the last war, Germany was heid down with an iron heel. The terms of Versailles were the terms of a military victory, and when Germany defaulted on her payment of repa- rations, French troops occupied the Ruhr. But during the following two decades, Eng- land decided to disarm, while France allowed the equipment of her army to become obso- lete for modern warfare. Then Germany broke the terms of Versailles, rearmed and marched her troops back into the Rhine- land. When this happened, a few men in France and England, with greater vision than the rest, cried out that Ger t be stopped then, or that it would be forever too late. Their’ statements were met with popular indifference. During the most active years of German Yearmament, France and England exerted relatively little effort to compete. It seemed lace in Central Europe. But later, had trained her armies, built her air force and constructed the Sieg- fried Line, the demand grew in France and England for military action — a demand which culminated in the declaration of war of i935, and which has aiready caused the defeat of France and the devastation of England. While there was still time to fight, populace and politician refused to let the armies move. When the time to fight had passed, the armies were forced into a hopeless battle. I sat in England. one afternpon in 1928. listening to man who had charge of co-ordinating defense for the British gov- ernment. I had pleaded with him to take additional steps to safeguard the British position in aviation. T had told him that become as supreme in the air as England was at sea. He listened courteously, and then replied that if the wars in Spain and China had demonstrated one thing, it was that the danger of air bombardment, and the damage which could be inflicted by Tossly exagg sh aviation pro- ing “adequately expanded. A few months later, at the time of the Munich crisis, I went to see one of the fore- f that the strength of German aviation was under-estimated in England, and that the strength of Russian aviation was almost as much overestimated. He did not agree with me, although he admitted that the situation was serious. While I was there, however, he showed me an offic Teport concerning British antiaircraft units. The report stated that not enoug aircraft guns existed in all England an adequate defense for the city of alone. Yet that man at that mome advocating war, At the time of Munich, the Ro Force had only w few squadrons of fighters and bombers. The y planes were obsolete, And all of th together totaled a fraction of the air force. The condition of French 4 was even more deplorable. There 1 a single squadron in France equipp modern pursuit planes, and the €overnment was looking forward to ¢ when its aircraft production woul. 8 total of 200 fighting planes per mi ‘When I returned to Paris after. to Russia, in the fall of 1938, I i one of the members T gave him my the Russian and German forces, him of the tremendous expansion of 1 aviation that had taken place in G and that Russian aviation had been to keep pace. He replied that my et confirmed the worst fears id corresponded to the reports of mission they had recently sent to G I found that aviation circles in Fre that time, freely admitted that G would take supremacy of the air al s00n as a war started. From the standpoint of logic, the ; situation in Europe was in itself s reason to prevent a declaration of France end En land in 1939. But w looked farther, he found that the sa ditions existed in relation to the armies of Europe. Even the civilian tion of Germany had been trained pared for war, while the people in and England were not. One of the striking differences — France and England, during the immediately preceding this war, 1a: fact that France was alert to her by wondered whether war or revolutio break upon the country first. In I there was no danger of revolution, le of that nation had ves to the tempo of ¢! Their minds were still attuned to of sail rather than to that of aircrs way of life in England was ideal f of peace, but fata] for a modern - Germany, on the other hand, one nation t had risen from the pre of a previous defeat—a nation jess _