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coats ourselves; that we may be invaded by air- craft from the Greenland ice cap, or even by transatlantic parachute troops descend- ing on our city streets. They have alr led us far along the road to war—the same road that we traveled in 1917; then too at their behest, But there is one a)l-important difference between the European war when we entered it in 1917, and the European war today. It is this difference which must be brought to the attention of every American, for the entire future of our nation hangs upon it. It is, that when we entered the last war we could see how victory cowld be won, but today we cannot. In 1917, the Central Powers were fighting France and Great Britain in the west, Russia in the Italy in the south. The German armies had already suffered severe reverses, Even Japan had entered the war on the Allied side. in 1941, however, we face an entirely different situation. Germany has conquered France. She has an Blliance with Italy, col pl tr Europe from Spain to the Arctic Ocean. British shipping losses are already of the ~ -atmost seriousness, and the major ports and industrial centers of England have been heavily bombed. ‘The fact is that America is not in a posi- tion to wage a successful war in Europe under present conditions. We, ourselves, are not prepared, and even if we were, where would we send our soldiers to fight? How are we to force a landing on the European continent against the prepared positions of the strongest military power in the world? If the British, French and Belgian armies combined could not hold the fortifications they had spent years in building along the German border, how can we be expected to cross the Atlantic Ocean and invade the continent of Europe against the opposition of the same army, navy and air force that thrust the British fleet from the coast of Norway, and broke the Maginot Line? The people who shouted for England and France to declare war in 1939 called for suicide and defeat. Because of their hys- teria and blindness, the bravest men of France and England marched to disaster and to death. Whiie inteliectuais of Europe preached of Christianity, democracy and idealism, they threw a wave of human flesh against s fortified concrete line — without adequate guns, or tanks, or aircraft even for defense, to say nothing of attack. Has this attitude of life succeeded? Has tt gained freedom for France of security for England? Has it stamped out aggres- sion or heightened civilization? Has democ- racy gained or bas it lost through such leadership? These are questions that we in Amenca must answer. With failure in Europe before our eyes, shall we follo this same course? Shell we throw ourselves into war in a fervor of idealism, shouting about how we think the world should be run? Or shall we discuss calmly how our objectives can be accomplished, and ade- quately prepare ourselves to reach them? Personally, I believe that by our with- irawal from Europe after the last and our failure to prepare for this one many years ago, we are already committed to a pol of military “isolation.” I be- eve that if we abandon this policy at the Present time, we are courting national disaster, just as “France and England courted disaster when they, unprepared, Geclared war over the German invasion of Poland. A nation cannot change overnight from an attitude of peace to an attitude of war. It takes many years of planning and Preparation before great military strength can be attained. I believe it is not any longer a question of what we wish to do in this war, but rather one of what we cae foses, we are not strong enough to defend do. I believe that for us to enter the con- flict in Europe at this time would result in defeat and humiliation, If we are to enter such a conflict successfully, then we must prepare for it not for one year or for two, but for ten years or for twenty a8 Germany has done. On the other hand, I believe that we can build a military and commercia) position on this continent that is impregnable to attack, and which will force other nations to trade with us, if through expediency alone, Even if America intended eventually to dominate the entire world, as some People now seem to want us to do, I would say that our first step should be to consolidate our de- fenses at home, so that we could prepare ourselves in safety for our adventures be- yond the seas. . Every difficulty we would have in invading Europe would be an advantage for us in defending America. Our armies would be fighting on home soil, our Navy would be close to its our air force could strike with its utmost effect. It would be the enemy's probiem, not ours, to crosé the ocean with millions of troops and their supplies, fo pass by our submarines, our battleships, 4 q"oar bombing. planes, and to force @ Ending on American shores against the na of our coast artillery and our Army. : could not hold the coast a ¢ the German air fore en the British navy dared not remain A ‘Skagerrak, or even permanently in the North Sea; when the German military ma- chine, after crashing through the Maginot Line and routing the French army and the i citi force, has been held Br ish expedite by twenty-five miles of English Channel—how is any navy to ap- proach the shores of America and land an Invading army against the combined resist- ance of our military forces? There has been much discussion of an air invasion of America. This is partially aus te Pp nda, Pi nd partial! of wanda, partially to hys! ty, I. believe, to a misconception the so-called “air invasions” of Norway and Holland by the German air force. Person- ally, although I think the effectiveness of military aviation is still underestimated, I do not believe there is the slightest danger = purely sir of of 8 purely air of or at any time we can now foresee. To be gin with, the distance across the oceans is far too great to permit the air transport of armies large enough to invade us suc. cessfully, even if one assumes that they had 8 place to land unopposed by our own mili; tery forces. But, distance, we shot that there has never been a successful in- vasion by air, alone. The outstanding ex- amples of the use of aviation for invasion of enemy territory occurred during the ie Ger- man occupations of Norway and Holland. But in each of these instances. the landing of troops by air was carried on simultane- ously with the movement of ground and naval forces on a major scale. The maxi- mum number of troops that could have been transported and supplied by air would have been ineffective without the immediate sup- port of a ground army. If air invasion alone coul? be successful, it would have been used by the Germans against England many months ago, But what about the northern routes, cry the alarmists; won't we be invaded by way of Greenland and Alaska, where the dis- tances between land are short? Possibly the best answer to this question is in the form of another: Why, if these northern Toutes are so al tageous, do you suppore the commercial airlines to Europe and Asia prefer the great overwater distances far- ther south? The answer is that ice and fog and bitter cold still force men southward in their questa of commerce and of war. Ex- é . crews of cept in adventure and exploration, me low the routes which offer the gr safety and require the least effort — these are not in the north. if all the transatlantic air route simplest to fly is the one that lies be Africa and South America. This fi being used today in much of the war | ganda we hear. German airplanes, ¥ told, will fly to Africa by the thou hop’across the ocean to South Americ fuel and fiy up and invade the United 5 ing aside the problems that have to solved in Europe and . before thousands of German ir could take off on such a venture, let u sider what preparations would have made for their arrival in South Ame Brazil, to be ap There woul: to be dozens of previously prepare dromes, equipped with tanks and fu skilled mechanics. AJ] of th and supplies required would have transported by sea. In fact many transports and tens of thousands of ere would 9 8 be arranged, So that when anyone spe ir invasion via Africa and South / ca, he presupposes that Germany ha the war in Europe; that the countri has conquered are either 80 well sa or 80 completely subdued that she i to devote her attention to an inte spherical struggle (with Asia always back door); that she has Africa als in hand; and finally that she has, in ¢ tion to the armed forces of Brazil bac! our own Army, Navy and Air Corps wble to construct and supply the nec airdromes in eastern South America. After that, of course, it is still 7 trom eastern Brazil to the contine North America than it was from Ge originally, so other ups of air would have to be established, farther before enemy planes based in South 4 ca would have any advantage over planes based on their home airpo urope. And since there are no ra through that portion of South A‘ these bases too would have to be estat ry sea. No, the more one studies the pt invasion of America is entirely out question. Invading forces would ht come by sea, and if they made such tempt, it would be our American a that flew out to meet them and d raiding. Of ail the nations in the world, ¥ the most impregnable position of di ‘We have highly developed industries, rational resources and a population hundred and thirty million people which to draw. There is not a nat this hemisphere strong enough even | aid gous, We are flanked | Atlantic Ocean on the east, and the ‘on the west. In the north, we are pri by the wastelands of the Arctic. all history, has a nation been si plessed? ‘Then why in our maturi more than in our youth, “Why, bs weaving our destiny with that of a: of Europe, entangle our peace ant perity in the toils of European ar rivalship, interest, humor or caprice It is often asked today why our 1 ment program moves s9 slowly, W people are so divided and confused, indeed! The answer is clear. It is ' ‘we have neglected the wisdom and ence of our forefathers—we have 1 lowed Washington’s advice. We have destiny of America become confus entangled with that of foreign lan leaders have attempted to transfer for our own country to loyalty for of Europe.” One portion of our pec {4 RE