◆ SpookStack

to Headquarters read as follows: Approach to target will be directly out of the sun. One pass only. pilot proficiency and familiarity with the area makes this pattern feasible. Haze should make AAA sighting extremely diffi- cult into the sun. Bomb load NBR 2 will be 6 each 600 lb. [500 lb.?] GP on one aircraft and 10 each, 260 lb. frag on the other. All pilots volunteered. Crespo, *2 target with Piedra wing. Garcia and Herrera target #1. Above will allow max utilization air- craft and crews turnaround for D-Day strikes. Targets 1 and 2 will not be hit on D-Day if pilot report successful mission. TIDE in process of preparing ref sorties. Consensus here, above best tactics. Ad- vise soonest. 63/ As already indicated, however, Headquarters re- jected Thorsrud's appeal for the follow-up strike on D-l.* * The Thorsrud cable requesting the D-l strike raises some interesting -- but unresolved -- historical prob- lems. As noted, Thorsrud himself indicated that after reviewing the ~esults of the strike, the remainder of the day -- Saturday, 15 April 1961 -- was spent dis- cussing reattack; and he said that a request for such reattack, on D-l (Sunday, 16 April 1961) went forward to Headquarters. In reproducing a copy of this cable for the writer of this history, the Cable Secretariat copy of TIDE 654 (IN 3752) carries a date to be 20 April 1961 (0144Z) and the same cable is included in the DPD records -- if the date were correct, a cable arriving in Headquarters four days after the original request (footnote continued on following page) - 224 - ~~ -----~~~~~~~~~~---'-------------