◆ SpookStack

(footnote continued) and one day subsequent to the collapse of the 2506 Brigade. There is no explanation for this discrepancy, but Headquarters did get the request; for on 16 April 1961 a cable from the Director to TIDE (at 1714Z) read: Ref: TIDE 654. Regret unable approve strike per ref. Will advise D-Day strike schedule soonest. 64/ In view of this Director response, it is reason- able to assume that there was some unexplained hang-up in reproduction of the cable by the Cable Secretariat, otherwise, there would have been no response from Head- quarters rejecting the suggestion advanced in TIDE 654. In a subsequent cable to Headquarters (TIDE 710, 17 Apr 61), Thorsrud referred back to TIDE 654 and asked as follows: Request authority launch strike at San Antonio, Libertad, and Santiago airfields five minutes prior to sunset, as requested ref [TIDE 654]. Also, launch afternoon strikes today on basis pilot debriefings. 65/ One further discrepancy is that, in his 17 April cable requesting restrike at the airfields, Thorsrud also specified Santiago as well as San Antonio de los Banos and Libertad. The original request (TIDE 654) specified only the two fields, San Antonio de los Banos and Libertad. Eduardo Ferrer introduced another version of the D-2 air strike operation in his book Operacion Puma, claiming that the first strike on D-2 was the one which actually took place, but also claimed that a second follow-up strike was set up for the same crews at 1400 hours on the afternoon of 15 April 1961. In addition, Ferrer alleged that there were to be two follow-up strikes by the same crews on 16 April 1961, along with strikes against other military targets, bridges, and roads~ and that on 17 April, two more strikes would be made to complete the destruction. In short, three successive days of air strikes. 66/ _ ~ (footnote continued on following page) - 225 -