◆ SpookStack

Once having initiated tactical air operations against Cuba, the immediate question that comes to mind is why the planners scheduled a 48 hour break between the initiation of these operations and the strike which was planned for D-Day, 17 April 1961. Testifying before the Taylor Committee Col. George Gaines seemed opposed to the D-2 strike in favor of a D-l and D-Day air strikes. When queried about his opposition, however, Gaines responded as follows: I wouldn't use the word "opposed." I recommended that timing, militarily, would be better if you hit them on the day before D-Day -- or D-l -- and then go back the next day and get all of them. Once you start hitting them, don't have the interlude for them to move airplanes or create defenses. Nobody goes into a fight by popping a guy in the nose and then standing back five minutes and letting the guy get his bearings .•• and come to you. I was overruled, and so .•. I was not adamantly opposed •.. I just thought it was a better plan to go D-l instead of D-2. 67/ The Taylor Committee investigation also revealed some vast differences of opinion between representatives ~~ fl' '2-1-;£ Obviously Ferrer I who was assigned to fly trans- . - port missions, usually in C-46's, has confused the various on-again-off-again target plans and target lists which he had heard about from the B-26 pilots.