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advance of Burke, the General offered the following remarks about 0-2: The D-2 strikes were added for non- military reasons. We would have prefer- red to do without the 0-2 air strikes. They ~ere never intended to accomplish the destruction of the Castro Air Force. They were to lend plausibility to the story that the D-Day strikes had been launched from wi thin Cuba ..• I'd like to point out that the D-2 air strike was never expected to wipe out Castro's entire [Air] Force. It was the D-Day strike which was the important one. 69/* How the deception aspect of the 0-2 strike -- particu- larly considering the 48 hour stand down -- could pos- sibly have lent "plausibility" to the D-Day strike, the General failed to explain. Unfortunately, however, he was not called on for clarification~** * Emphasis by author. ** Of the senior military personnel called before the Taylor Committee only General Decker of the Army is on record in support of the D-2 air operation. Decker testified: The advantages of pre-D-Day strikes would be that Castro's aircraft would be knocked out prior to the landing. I was in favor of pre-D-Day strikes two or three days in advance. 70/ General David Gray who was responsible for liaison between the Joint Staff and CIA said nothing pro or con about the D-2 strike, emphasizing in his testimony only that the Joint Staff's understanding of the air opera- tions plan was that there would be D-Day air strikes out of Puerto Cabezas beginning at dawn. 71/