◆ SpookStack

before the 1M. Rusk that he and the President ~ ~ ..~', ;i?.. D-_ strike; ~ secretary of State Rusk's testimony Taylor Committee'" twas :~1.' .a.J-. claim~,among other things, ~ A.· fbi [? • r;.. there was to be a iZ; ,? "J p·stftrtr.Qe r I.SI_iIttttt!i~iIleiPCl1UMJ1d411:¥1fit5· L. 6: U$~iS:c.: p it ~ h also told the Committee that "there was an inadequate appreciation of the enemy's capability in the air." 7la/ Less than two years after this display of innocence, Mr. Rusk compounded his error when the subject came up during an appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In a briefing on 16 January 1963, Rusk told the Committee that with reference to the BOP: It is also true that in terms of the deficiencies of information that turned up after the event, that the count of planes on the island [Cuba] from sources on the island as well as other resources turned out to be inaccurate. There were some planes in hangars and so forth that were not hit with [sic] the strike that did take place, and more planes, in fact, turned out from the Cuban side than had been anticipated. 7lb/ Rusk's comment is completely unsupported by any evidence that has surfaced since the col¥P3se of the invasion. /") To the c~pntrary, one area in which the - 229 -