◆ SpookStack

appeared at a loss to the reason for the D-2 air strike rather than 'a" D-l or a D-Day air strike. He emphasized that militarily the nature of the air strike itself was a give-away to the impending invasion, and he was able, in effect, to reinforce his reinforce- ments.* The strike on the airfields was clearly dif- ferent than the harassing tactics which had been em- ployed heretofore aqainst the Fidelistas sabotage of sugar mills and industrial facilities and fires in cane fields were not in the same category as an air operation which obviously sought to destroy the revolutionary air force. The message to Castro and his leaders was clear. The Army, the Militia, and the people were given common cause; and it stimulated their will to resist. 73/** * It also served as a signal to Castro to adopt vigorous measures to insure that the attacks did not provide, the catalyst for a "spontaneous" uprising to overthrow the regime. Mass arrests of potential dis- sidents began "just a few hours after the air attack on 15 April." 72a/ ** Clarence F. Welch, the air materiel chief for DPD during Project JMATE, told the author that shortly be- fore the D-2 operation he was in attendance at a meet- ing on the project at DPD Headquarters at 1717 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. In the course of that meeting, Welch claimed that two Department of State attendees (footnote continued on following page) - 231 -