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e egos eel Pat cowtT ' TI WL pa ’ One suggestion for achieving this is that the current Saison government be pressed to establish a council of notables repre- senting a wide cross section of civilian and religious leaders who, in conjunction with the Saigon government, could form a negotiat- ing authority. Such a council might initiate a representative refer- endum in Saigon and other urban centers on the issue of whether or not the government should enter into negotiations with the National Liberation Front. Such a referendum might be conducted under international auspices, thus providing a precedent for the elections that will have to be conducted after a treaty is negotiated. Even then it would be difficult to arrange a fair vote because of unsettled political conditions, intensified by the large number of displaced persons. Tf major obstacles arose in setting up a new Geneva-type confer- ence, it might be necessary to convene a new group of concemed powers, possibly through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General. Some exploratory efforts, preferably quiet and ntivate. Would clearly be necessary hefore a decision on the best private, Wold cieaniy Be hecessary Octore @ Cecision om tne pest way to solve this problem could be made. The United Nations itself would in normal circumstances be the natural springboard for the Jaunching of negotiations, the over- seeing of a cease-fire, the policing of elections, and the carrying on of necessary peace-keeping activities. Expertise in these areas has been developed through years of varied experience, Many per- sons in the United States have suggested a major role for the United Nations. Unfortunately, in this case the United Nations faces the particular difficulty that it is not acceptable as a mediat- ing body to the Democratic Republic of Victnam, to the National Liberation Front, or to the People’s Republic of China. Neither Hanoi nor Peking belongs to the United Nations. Ever since the Korean War they have viewed the world organization with great suspicion as a tool of the United States. In his pelicy declaration giving the Four Points, Premier Pham Van Dong said, “Any ap- proach tending to secure a United Nations intervention in the VietNam situation is also inappropriate because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam.” The United States in its conduct has dene little to allay this suspicion, and indeed in the midst of the whole escalation-