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PEACE IN VIETNAM negotiation see-saw in the fall of 1965, the State Department was engaged in convincing as many national representatives as possible that the government of mainland China should not be given the credentials for representing China in the United Nations, U Thant as Secretary General has made some helpful offers to mediate and he may yet play a valuable role. 3. Once the Geneva-type conference has been convened, its first task would be to encourage Saigon and the National Libera- tion Front to reach agreement on the formation of a Vietnamese Provisional Executive to maintain temporary administration of South Vietnam and take measures necessary for the establishment of a provisional government, Such arrangements would not be simple and the early inclusion of an international force is likely to be required. In an inflammatory situation with anarchy and chaos near the surface, transitional steps of government are not easily carried out. However, the experience of Algeria and the Dominican Republic can be cited to show that, at least under sore circumstances, a provisional executive has been 2 possible formula. 4. International supervisory forces should be brought into South Vietnam under the acgis of the negotiating conference as euriy as possible. A natural starting point is the International Control Commission (ICC) set up for the Geneva Conference of 1954. Both sides have indicated willingness to use the {CC as a point of departure. Insofar as the provisional government can estab- lish stable authority, the function of the international forces could be minimized, and yet they might be needed to restrain certain militant elements on either side which might attempt to sabotage the negotiations. Such a presence might also be of help in guaranteeing against reprisals. 5. The phased withdrawal of United States forces cannot be blueprinted this far in advance of negotiations. It is likely that as the provisional government, with the help of international pulice, takes over control, the United States forces should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible into three or four enclaves. These enclaves could be sanctuaries for refugees fearing reprisals and bases for logistical support that might still be needed for international forces. The drawing into enclaves would be a temporary move preparatory to complete withdrawal and dismantling of bases.