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pee a hs POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT 73 6. The provisional government would direct the demobilization of armed forces on both sides and the withdrawal from South Victoam of all outside forces, both North Vietnamese and Amer- can, under the surveillance of the international presence. The provisional government would also be responsible for conducting elections, again under the scrutiny of an international umpire. The object of such elections might be a Constitutional Assembly or an actual permanent government. 7. Successful negotiations may still leave some elements in South Vietnam in danger of reprisals. Predictions have varied greatly as to the number of persons on either side who might need to seek sanctuary, The tyne of recime develoned in nesotiations and PO SEOs SAOCIuary, gat oye Of POR GOV Oped ib MeQoator elections would make an important difference. On the side of opti- Mistic predictions is the amazingly favorable experience of the amnesty and exchange of persons between the two zones after the first Geneva Conference. On the pessimistic side is the cruel nature of the current civil war, which may lead to personal vendettus in the villages and mass reprisals. The United States would certainly owe an obligation to assist persons who felt they might be in jeor- ardy because of the United States military withdrawal. A precedent is already at hand in the case of Cuban refugees. Special legislation would be needed to bring them into this country. This would be costly, but the war is now being conducted at an infinitely greater expense. 8. The final act of the Geneva-type conference shoukld be an international agreement guaranteeing Vietnam’s neutrality and its freedom from any outside interference. Major questions such as reunification should be left to the Vietnamese after the estab- lishment of responsible government in South Vietnam and the achievement of relative stability. There should be guarantees against armed intervention or infiltration from either North ar South Vietnam in the affairs of the other state, but it should be made clear that nothing in the agreement precludes even- tual reunification of North and South should the Vietnamese so decide. Provisions for commercial and cultural exchange, free- dom of movement, and postal service berween the two countries might well be included. 9. The way may then be open to fulfill the long-delayed prom-