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cant that the Secretary added that “erther-one of these ways would be wholly agreeable to the United States.” One should note, however, that Secretary Acheson did not thereby abandon the idea of proceeding with actual dis- armament by slow stages. His remarks referred to commission procedure, and meant thar che United States is willing to dise-uss simultaneously all aspects of the problem while maintaining that acrual implementation of decisions should proceed cau- tiously by stages. The Sovier Union ales clarified its v view on one aspect ao of the problem of stages, at the Sixth General Assembly. Whereas it, initially demanded an immediate and unconditional ban on atomic weapons and reduction of conventional arms with controls applied after the ban, Mr. Vyshinski on January 12, 1952 stated that the atomic weapon should be prohibited and strict international control put into effect simulfancously and without delay. If the Assembly would proclaim at once the principle of prohibiting atomic arms and establishing controls, he claimed, international tensions would be reduced and the atmosphere cleansed of atomic war propaganda, even though the ban would have no legal effect until control machinery began to function. That the Sovier Union has affirmed its acceptance of simultancity in principle is an indication that compromise may be possible. A possible solution to these dif- ferences is suggested on pages 34-334. roughour postwar disarma- ment discussions the question of safeguards has been central. There has been general agree- ment that the control system should be established and oper- ated within the framework of the Security Council and that the control organ make day-to-day decisions by majority vote. In addition, Mr. Bernard Baruch, acting upon his own initiative but wich the assent of Secretary of State Byrnes, in- jected the notion that the veco should be waived in the Sccurity Council when considering the application of sanctions (diplo- matic, economic, financial, and military) against an offending nation. From the start, spokesmen for the Soviet Union were hostile to Mr. Baruch’s suggestion for waiving the veto with 24 “ respect to action in the Security Council. According to Saviet spokesmen this would shatter the foundation upon which the United Nations is buile. With the Security Council dominated by the “Anglo-American bloc” the Soviet Union would be at the mercy of the western powers. Morcover, this alteration of the United Nations Charter would make it possible for the small powers represented on the Security Council, with the aid of one or more big powers, to commit the entire United Nations to what might in fact be a third world war. Mr, Ra ruch a nd other spok Brmean for the West wmroce ard okesmen pressed their case very hard and in the end won approval by a majority of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. Nevertheless, as time passed, there appeared a growing disposi- tion to raise no great objection to the Soviet position as far as the veto in the Security Council is concerned. The United States has not only refrained from pressing the issue since 1946 buc has delicately suggested thac waiver of the veto is not essential, At Paris during the 1951-52 discussions the issue was not mentioned in official pronouncements. 25