◆ SpookStack

By “drastic” we mean the reduction of arms and armed forces to levels required for domestic police purposes. 6. All types of weapons, arms installations and armed forces should be subject fo a single iuclusive system of interna- tional inspection and confrol. To us it appears futile to reduce navies without also cutting aircraft and land forces, or to ban weapons of mass destruction without also controlling conven- tional arms. The threat posed by armaments to the peace, security and economic well-being of rhe nations of the world lies not in particular classes of wezpons, but in total fighting potential. 7. Adequate safeguards against either evasions or open violations must be provided by the control plan. This does not mean that the plan must necessarily be “foolproof” in the absolute meaning of thae term. Some risks must undoubtedly be accepted, bur under an adequate plan these would be mini- mal compared to present risks in the absence of any cancrols. 8. All nations with substantial military potential should participate in the plauning aud establishment of an interna- tional arms reduction program. Application of this principle will require some arrangement whereby Germany, Japan, Italy, the Chinese Peoples Republic and other nations—not now members of the United Nations—can be brought into the discussions and agreements. 9. Disarmament agreements should be negotiated within the framework of the United Nations, and the necessary con~ frol organ should operate within the same framework. This does not mean thac two or more nations ought not to discuss armaments any time they choose, or chat single nations should not pursue a policy of unilateral disarmament for economic relief and to clear the air of suspicion in its relations with other nations. But it does mean that the United Nations may prop- erly take the initiative and keep insisting that the search for agreement be continued and that the system of control operate under-its auspices. 10. Disarmament can begin at once. Drastic reduction and sermanent International control of national arsenals will and permanent internabigna: Contr: Of Nation arsenais Wil, we believe, make the world both safer and Iess tense than ar 28 present. It is unnecessacy, therefore, to await implementation of the collective measures provisions of the United Nations Charter, as some have suggested, before starting to disarm. Nor is it necessary to construct a world super-government with a monopoly of force, as others suggest, before beginning drastic reduction of armaments. With mass death- dealiag weapons banned, with other weapons drastically reduced, and with a world-wide control organ in successful operation, the confi- dence generated and experience gained should contribute greatly toward the peaceful evolution of a stronger world government. PROPOSALS Next Steps The plan of procedure agreed upon at Paris during the winter of 1951- $2 when the General Assembly established the new Disarmament Commission out- lined the following steps: (1) The Disarmament Com- mission is to prepare plans and drafe treaties destgned to accorn- . plish the objective of disarmament; (2) when the Disarma- ment Commission deems it advisable, a disarmament conference is to be called to discuss and conclude the proposed treaty of treaties; (3) the signed treaties would then be submitted for ratification to participating, scates in accordance with their respective constitutional processes; (+) ratification: would in turn be followed by United Nations action toward putting the treaties into effece and actual operation. The Control Organ To administer and execute the commic- ments made tn the treaties, it will be necessary to establish, within the framework of the Security Coenuncl an international contro! crean. Under this office an ney, an international cor orga wnder tis Gihce an internacional inspectorate should be statfed with expert and impartial personnel drawn from many countries but account- able only to the control organ. The inspectorate should inter- change its personnel as often as possible, and ic should be given authority to inspect armaments, armed forces and all support- ing facilities and installations. This proposal appears to be acceptable to all partics. Banning the Bomb = Ail parties agree in principle to an eventual ban on the use, possession and 29