◆ SpookStack

ee eer production of the atom bomb and other weapons of mass destruction, and the use of fissionable marerials for peaceful Purposes only, The problem of timing is undecided; this is discussed below under ‘Schedule of Arms Reduction.” Ownership & Management Under che circumstances pre- of Atomic Facilities viously described, it would seem wise to abandon the idea of international ownership and management of the world’s to hold, manage, license and inspect would have all the prob- lems of a noa-owning control organ plus countless more, many of which would contain seeds of discord. The United States has been the chief proponent of inter- national ownership of atomic facilides, and adoption of the above proposal would require her to yield this point. To do so promptly, we believe, would contribute more co reaching agreement on the total problem of disarmament than any L 1 TT 1 ww ' 2 Other Concession tne United States may reasonably De-ex pected “dangerous” atomic facilities, excepe, perhaps, as the Carnegie Endowment committee has suggested, where nations may elect to place their atomic industries under international trust. : ac AG. and Future production Must be restricted t quotas denned in appropriate treaties, with the understanding that permissible production would be subject to the strictest possible accounting and inspection. Unlimited non-military research using minor quantities of nuclear fuel would be permitred in national and international laboratories with the understanding that interna- tional laboratory staffs will include representatives of interested countries, and thar all national laboratories will be subject to continuing and thorough inspection. Spokesmen for the West may objecc thac adoption of these proposals would permit diversion of nuclear fuels and clan- destine activity in sufficient amounts to give strategic advan~- tage to an offending nation. That this is a conceivable danger must be admitted.” Its prevention will depend upon the scale of production of fissionable material permitted, the competence of the control organ and its staff, the design of the facilities, the accounting system, and inspection. Given the will to do so, we believe sufficient technical and scientific know-how can be Del uincient feciinical ancy ae BMG now Can DC found to devise the type of administrative organization and controls required to insure competence, responsibility, relia- bility, and dependable indices of compliance. Jf che control organ is given adequate authority and its staff are competent and impartial, we fail to see how jt matters whether they operate as officers of the control organ or as agents of a TVA- like supra-national authority, International ownership might conceivably make the cask of inspecting authorized aromic installations a bit easier. But an atomic colossus standing astride che world with authority 30 Existing Stockpiles of The existence of large stockpiles of Fissionable Materials fissionable materials presents 3 new problem of disarmament planning. Though potentially valuable at some future time for atomic power, these materials need only be placed in atomic bomb cases to render a “peaceful” stockpile a cremendous arsenal for war, Morcover, the bomb cases can easily be concealed, and their secret fabrication, though didticult, would be hard to detect. Huge facilities have been buile to refine uranium ore and to convert it into fissionables. If cach nation keeps control of the ambiguously peaceful output of these plants, the cemp- tation co keep building up these stockpiles will remain, Vesting the international control organ with legal ticle to these stockpiles and facilities does not solve this problem if the stockpiles stay where they can be seized and in such form as will permit rapid convecsion to bombs. Nor does “strategic balance,” the solution proposed in the United Nations Majority Plan, seem practicable any Jonger. This principle would have distributed atomic stockpiles and “dangerous” facilities among the nations se that, if ong nation wrongfully seized the stock piles and facilities inside irs boundaries, the other nations could legally take over theirs and so promptly nuilify any military gain co the wrong-deer. But che “balance” chis plan requires would be meaningful today only if ie were achieved between the Wese and the East. Ir could be reached only if the United States were to turn over a large part of its own atomic stock- pile to Sovier bloc countrics. To expect the United States to do oe seems neither realistic nor reasonable. though giving custody of national stockpiles to the 31 re Bo en