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rn ae - oe _owweutu wien considering the appli- cation Ol sanctions, but to accepe the suggestion, now agree- able both to the United States and ihe Soviec Union, thac the control organ should make day-to-day decisions by majority vote. Thus the control organ would decide by majority vote when, what, and how to inspger, and whether or not vielations occur. If serious violacions are established and reported, the Security Council would deal with threats co or breaches of the peace as normally, thar is, with the veto operating as nticioated by rhe (Mhaeter anticipated by the “narter. Retaining the veto in the Security Council might admic« tedly prevent that body from taking collective measures against a violator. However, this would not prevent the appli- cation of collective measures against a violator under an ad oe coalition of powers. Moreover, realization of the awful con- sequences of the collapse of the control system would certainly not be withour effect on would-be violators. Veto or no veto, the collapse of the control system would immediately result, if negotiation failed, in a renewal of the arms race and the threat of war. Ais indicated earlier, there is sufficient evidence that the United States has dropped its insistence on waiver of the veto, hence agreement on this point appears possible, Schedule of Arms Reduction We would suggest the follow~ ing schedule: Sfage 1: Imme- diately repudiating the use (but not yet the production and possession) of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction; and simultaneously establishing the control organ and inaugu- rating the disclosure and verification of armament data. The same agreement could stipulate that the ban on the use of atornic weapons will terminate any time the control organ reports that its operations are being irapreperly restricted, Stage 2: A standstill agreement, negotiated as quickly as pos- sible, which would halt the arms race and permic armament production only for replacemenc. Séage 3: The determination of limits and quotas which will govern both che drastic reduc- tion of conventional arms and armed forces and also the dis- posal of existing stockpiles and future production of fissianable materials, the object being to guarantee that in the process of 34 reducing arms no nation or bloc of nations would gain sub- stantial strategic advantage. Sfaye 4: A complete ban on atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, including production and possession of them; disposal of existing stockpiles of fission- ables and the imposition of production quotas; and rapid move~ mene toward drastic reduction of conventional arms, armed forces and facilities. This final stage should be pur into effect not later than two years afcer the first stage goes into effect. These proposals would go part of the way toward meet- ing the Soviet Union's demands by granting a ban on the use of atomic weapons for an interim period with assurances that the ban would be extended to possession and production if the control organ functioned properly and without interfer- ence. This arrangement would provide a test of sincerity and reveal the data necessary to determine balanced and equiva- lent reductions. It would also fix targee dates which would, in turn, discourage stalling, and it might get disarmament dis- cussions off dead center. : As matters now stand, the Soviet Union has agreed to simultaneous banning of atomic weapons, instituting controls, and reducing conventional arms and armed forces by one- third. The Uniced States insists on proceeding cautiously from disclosure and verification to the outlawry of atomic weapons and the balanced reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, Adoption of our proposal would require concessions by both blocs. Criteria for Arms Reduction Ali factors considered, it ap- Pears necessary to reach agrec- ment on a principle of progressive limitation and balanced reduction of conventional arms, facilities and armed forces, provided the reduction would be drastic, Substantial reduc- tion in most categories should be made during the first year the agreement calling for reduction is in operation. The United States has suggested that two criteria be used in calculating mits and quotas-—~ population (for armed forces) and gross national product (for military budgets). Other factors could also be used. Bue care must be taken that no factor is made use of for the strategic advantage of any nation or bloc of nations. For example, if active and reserve 35