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wun organ until peaceful uses can be found for them would not make seizure impossible, it would at least make the illegality of seizure plain to all che world, a fact that would deter any nation not blatanrly bene on war. Since the United States has much the largest stockpile and since so far Soviet spokesmen have shown no interest in safeguards against seizure, perhaps the United States should not stress this problem in its search for a “foolproof” plan. if greater protection is desired, this could be gained at considerable expense by transmuting existing fissionables into non-explosive form, so that another long and costly operation would be required to re-transmute them to their present state. Conceivably the “denaturing” process would stilf permit some peaceful uses of che fissionables, but no recent scientific reports have encouraged hope for this, Another protective measure might allow control authorities ro set up an international de- pository under multi-national guards in neutral territory, say SR MGR aL BOPErOory, sayy in Eastern Greenland. Under such a plan attempts at seizure | could be countered by measures rendering the deposited material inaccessible except after very protracted recovery operations. The problem of what to do with existing stockpiles is un- questionably a dificult one—bur aot as difficult as the problem of producing an atomic bomb, Inspection = Fortunately, the decision to unite both atomic and apnventional weapons in a system of controls has considerably clarified and eased the problem of inspection. The nations should agree on permanent international inspec- tion on a continuing basis of both atomic and conventional armaments, armed forces and afl supporting facilities concur- rently, This assumes there would be a permanent corps of trained impartial inspectors attached and responsible to the control organ for inspection service anywhere in the world. The inspectorate should be given freedom, within limits defined by the control organ, to inspect anything at any time and any place. The minute the control plan goes into effect, inspectors would proceed to prepared stations where some of them could remain continuously as observers (but without managerial authority), others could begin checking declared data, and still others could begin a systematic survey intended to disclose 32 and verify all important data bearing directly upon a nation’s milicary potenzial. Iz seems unnecessary to grant to the rnspec- torate such powers as are not appropriate.or ‘essential to effec- tive inspection. Problems such as whether aerial photography should be permitted (which caused Russia to balk in 1947} are not likely to prove diffcule under a control plan which extends to all armaments, since military secrecy would no longer be maintainable. Inspection would be “permanent” and “continuous” in the sense that it would be in progress at all times with inspec- tors assigned at all cimes to some critical spots, such as the locations of atomic reactors and stockpiles. After the first inventory is completed, the number of inspectors could per- PIVEN yy 43 MPA, te Mibee Ga litsy wis Lu haps be reduced, but with a guarantee that enough would be on hand to observe critical spots continuously, ro check indices of related financial, economic and military activities, ta process data submitted by governmental agencies, and ta make special investigations on suspicion or complaint. Normal diplomatic and consular establishments and national intelligence services could lodge complaints and, as a further precaution, the flow of imports and exports could be monitored, The United States has insisted on “permanent” and “con- tinuous” inspection, but as an addition to a plan for incerna~ tional ownership and management of atomic production facilities. The Soviet Union has not objected thus far to per- manent and continuous inspection of Conventional armament, armed forces and facilities. The two nations, therefore, may not be as far apart on this point as they have sometimes ap- peared, except for the ownership principle. Qur proposal would urge the United States to continue emphasizing the need for inspection of anything the control organ decides, at any time and any place, bur would require her to yield the point of inter- national ownership and management. From the Sovier Union our proposal would require a willingness to permit the contin- uing observation of critical spots and freedom io inspect any- thing the control organ decides, at any time and any place. Violations and the Velo In the light of the factors de- scribed at the end of Chaprer I, it would seem necessary to abandon the proposal that the veto . a3