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It] PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSALS GS ORESMEN for both East and West have acclaimed their respective proposals for disarmament so long and loudly i ion thac each has offered the only as to create the impression thac each has offered the only workable and desirable proposals. In consequence, the respec- tive plans have become stereotypes for which gallant defenders stand ever ready to do forensic battle. This may gratify par- ticipants and perhaps serve certain limited propaganda objec- tives, buc it has created an atmosphere uncongenial to reason- able negotiation and agreement. Bebeving that social problems rarely lend themselves to one and only one solution, we would bear in mind that there are many possible alrernatives in any given ficld of conerol. The following proposals are thus not intended as a one-and- only plan, but rather as suggestions that may help loosen rhe Tigidity of conflicting stereotypes and move the nations a bit closer toward agreement. PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS Discussion of details invariably is simplified if there is prior agreement on underlying principles, We are, of course, aware that some governments may hold for complete agreemene on broad principles before being willing to talk about concrete details. But ic must also be remembered that sometimes prin- ciples become clearer or can be more acceptably stated thraugh discussions of specific factors, Nevertheless, we believe the ‘following principles and assumptions provide a basis for dis- cussing detailed plans. 1, Armaments ave both a symptom and a contributing cause of international feusions. Their very existence is evidence of distrusc and suspicion and a cause of additional anxiecy. The great expansion of a suspicion-breeding secrecy on bath sides of the Iron Curtain during and since World War IT has 26 Created additional uncertamty and insecurity. In a dilemma Where suspicion breeds armaments and armaments augment Suspicion, successful negotiation at any point may help’ break the vicious circle. In the world of 1952 an agreement in Korea or Germany would certainly help the disarniament discussions, but the reverse of this would also be true. This being the case, real progress toward peace requires new efforts to reduce arma- ments drastically withour delay. 2. Mutual concessions are required for any acceptable aud workable plan for drastic arms reduction. Any such plan must begin with a recognition of the rights, interests and pre- vailing attitudes of all parties. Agreement cannot be expected _ on terms that require substancially greater concessions from one power bloc than from another. Agreement will also require willingness to change from positions heretofore taken. In rhe present context this means reciprocal concessions by propo- _nencs of both the United States and the Soviet Union proposals. 3. Further expansion of arms production should cease. This step, important at all levels of the arms reduction pro- gram, is the basic preliminary for a drastic reduction of arma- ments and a mutual expression of good faith, 4. Weapons of mass destruction should be banned, Ut world-wide fear and insecurity are to be overcome, stockpiles of the basic ingredients of such weapons (atomic, bacterio- logical, and other cypes) should be limited, under strict and effective international control, co peaceful purposes only. Official statements indicate a general desire to ban certain to-be-defined mass death-dealing weapons. We would like to see the list made as inclusive as possible. $. Conventional arms should be reduced drastically. The more drastic the cutback of arms and armed forces, the less difficule will ic be to establish equivalents among tke powers by which a balance can be maintained at all times. Mere “pro- gressive limitation and gradual reduction” of arms will invite delaying and stalling tactics by governments and affected inter- est groups. But a general agreement cto reduce the levels of ‘armament drastically and as soon as equivalents can be estab- lished would make such delaying tactics considerably less likely, ‘ 27