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i» 6 ge “ be Pa. EAL Seb beh BAR wre Paet bet be be oe Fe bet ef 8h bee BD edie’ On O Mets 5° SMe na BD EBOr tettow F48s st oe © a6 feb Bee bed - Sedge Saygert, without reference to the specific discovery orders expert. 17/ by the trial juize or the standard applied in detemining whether its orders were dgmored and vhether the inposition of sanctions was warranted, directs the district court, on remand, to impose sanctions. His order, reversing the district Court's finding and april 15, 1977 order is improper. “It attempts to substitute the Court of Appeals' opinion for that of the trial judge, who was in the best position to assess the’ intent and conduct of the defendants and their counsel. Tn Margoles Vv. Johns, 587 F.2d 885, 888 (7th. Cir. 1978), the district court dismissed: the plaintiffs' slander action because of the plaintiffs’ wilful failure. “to obey the court's order for production of documents. This court affirmed, stating, “Under"National Hockey ‘League, we are not. free to substitute the exercise of our " discretion for that of the district court." Other courts have held that the decision wither or not to impose sanctions for a failure to make discovery rests "13/° - with the district judge and not the sopeliaie courts. uty Faixchild and Pell disagres ‘with onions Swygert that sanctions mst be. 14 wo, imposed. _ Nevertheless, ‘they direct a district. conct to reconsider the matter. 7, Rule 37 clearly requires adherence to court orders only; —e which are not contained in a court order do not appear to fall within the ambit of Rule 37. Burkett v. Chandler, 505 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Sylvester, et al., 41 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1930); Berry v. Midtown Service Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939); Boylan v. Detrio, 187 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1951). Moreover, before one may be punished for contempt for violating a court order, the terms of the order must be clear and specific with no doubt or uncer- tainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed. In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also, N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 261 F.2d 503, rev'd on other grounds, 80 S.Ct. 441; N.L.R.B. v. Bell Oil Gas Co., 98 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1938); McFarland v. United States, 295 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1924). : . Judge Perry recognized the dilenma caused by the various orders and stated to “all the parties that he (himself) had to take the blame because the weak- ness and ambiguity of the order he entered necessarily lent itself to differ- ing interpretations as to what was and was not to be produced. (Tr. 7425-26). 21 See, Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir. 1970) cert. ‘denied, 400 U.S. 878; Britt v. Corporacion Peruana DeVapores , ‘506 F.2d 927, 932 (5th Cir. 1975). 14/ Judge Pell, in fact, recognizes that the district judge was in the best position . to guage the good faith of the defense efforts to comply with his orders and specifically states that there'is no necessity for the imposition of sanctions. ~72.