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Secretary Rusk's reference to the meeting with General Cabell and Mr. Bissell on the evening of 16 April, also raises the question of the Secretary of State's understanding of what he had been told would happen to the brigade's ships if Castro's Air Force was not destroyed. To suggest that the CIA representa- tives did not believe that there were "over-riding considerations" for conducting the D-Day air strike would appear to have been a a deliberate misinterpretation of their very reason for making their protests about the cancellation of the D-Day strike. If nothing else, General Cabell's subsequent visit to Secretary Rusk at 4:30 on the morning of 17 April to request Presidential authorization for USN air cover should have alerted the Secretary of State to the fact that the Agency was extreme.ly concerned about the fate of the operation. Mr. Rusk's explanation for the late time at which the cancellation of the D-Day strike was ordered should not have gone unchallenged by the committee. Secretary Rusk should have been presse~ for details concerning Stevenson's role and asked why, 'evenif Sec'retary Rusk had been unaware of the planned D-2 strike, he didn't contact both the UN Ambassador and CIA immediately upon learning of the strike on 15 April in order to coordinate the US position. After the fact of Ambassador Stevenson's unintentional lie to the UN on Saturday afternoon (including the farce of the B-26 photos), it seems apparent that Secretary Rusk was more concerned about the 101