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image problem than he was about the success at Bahia de Cochinos. Had the Taylor Committee acted at this time, many harsh words and bitter recriminations concerning Mr. Stevenson's role might have been avoided. Mr. ,C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's principal deputy, failed to make any mention of the planned D-2 air strike when briefing Ambassador Stevenson on 8 April 1961.* When Secretary Rusk was asked if he understood the importance of air cover for the planned attempt by brigade ships to resupply ammunition to the beach, Secretary Rusk provided a "yes" and "no" answer saying, "It was apparent that it [air cover] was critical. The requirement for air cover wasn't as apparent as for air drops and getting the ships back in there, 100/ particularly in regard to getting them some tank ammunition." At this time, on 4 May 1961, Rusk still did not understand what General Cabell and Mr. Bissell had told him on the evening of 16 April 1961--that the exposure of the brigade's ships to Castro's aircraft would result in disaster. * It was not until Sunday, 16 April 1961, probably late in the morning or early in the afternoon, that Stevenson learned from Richard F. Pedersen, then Chief of the Political Section of the US-UN operation, that the statements that 99/ he, Stevenson, had made to the UN on Saturday were false. For details of the Stevenson story re the second strike, the reader is referred to Studies in Intelligence, Fall 1983, pp. 37-47. 102