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26 THE TECHNIQUES OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA Huk gue Guerrilla activity in Burma, 1949. Bloody riots in ogo Colombia, 1951, inary coup of Arbenz in Guatemala, 1955. Riots in Caracas, Venezuela, 1958. Guerrilla warfare in Laos and Vietnam, beginning 1960. Terrorism in Angola and Cameroun, beginning in 1960. ~ Generalized guerrilla warfare in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, beginning in 1960. Murders and rape of white women at Léopoldville, the 0, 1961. roppmbings in Zanzibar and violent uprisings in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda, These bloody scenes, played by communism on the world stage and already responsible for thousands of deaths, must be supplemented by the enterprises which blew up into veritable wars in China, Korea, and Laos, or which were stifled to murderous repressions in Hungary and Tibet. Communist terrorism is sometimes characterized by extreme inso- lence as in Venezuela, where Communist students murdered a teacher in a classroom; where sunburned employees returning after a 2-month > absence publicly informed their foreman, ‘“We went into the mountains with the gui las;” and where the president of the Communist Party, during a parliamentary session, answered the complaint of an indus- trialist that his factory had been forced to close after an explosion, putting 500 workers on the street, with: “I’m sorry, but the historic process required it.” In Vietnam, Laos, and Angols, Communist guerrillas perpetrated horrible atrocities; butchered notables, obscenely mutilated women buried priests alive, bombed echools, pillaged leper colonies, and burned crops. In Stanleyville terrorism reached its nadir in outright cannibalism, as threatened by the Communist leader of the rebels Ghenye, in @ public speech. Here again the “historic process required it”—a process which restores prehistoric conditions. _ Communist guerrilla activity seeks the shadows, as do all Commu- nist enterprises. It claims to be “nationalist” rather than Commu- nist, allowing the dupes of the free world to pretend that Lumumba, Castro, Cardenas, Juliac, and their like are not Communists. How- ever, following an airplane accident in Peru, documents were found in the attaché case of a Cuban diplomat which established the total organizational, financial, and mili ary subservience of Juliao to the Havane Communist apparatus. The Vietnamese guerrillas are wholly remote controlled by Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. They must cut throats because communism fails to win hearts. Their goals are to demorslize the population and intimidate the masses; to discredit legitimate leaders and undermine their diplomats; to recruit partisans and multiply desperados. Thus it is plain that recourse to violence is not at all unusual in political warfare, although such methods do not evolve into the confrontation of classical war. These violent actions are only the frosting on the cake. The fundamental business of the enterprise is still the molding of public opinion and the control of men. Violence wields a sword in political intrigue but remains subservient to its design, its extent determined by political goals, and its utilization contemplated in political planning. Violent tactics can only attract recruits in a climate created by the political apparatus. Even when