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67. ‘Continued: at least initially. If U enforcezent of the blockade involved use of force by the US, tke Sovlets night respond cn an equivalent level, but would seek to avoid escalaticn. 16. ‘Thus eny blockede situaticn wovld place tke Soviets under no immediate pressure to cEcese a resronse with force. Trey cculd rely on political neans to compel tke US to desist, and reserve a resort to force until the US had actually used force. They would estimte that tke in- herent difficulties of enforcing the blockade ami the generally adverse 1 reactions, incliding those of US allies to it, would result in enorzous pressures on the US to desist. They could heighten these pressures by threatening retaliation in Berlin or actually unfertaking cejor harass- tents on the access routes, which could becoze tantamount to a blockade, and would probably do so at some stage. 17. We do not believe that even a severe blockade, cf itself, would bring down the Cuban regime. Castro would tighten internal security and, unless action against the regire subseavently developed on Cuban soil, i 1 the Cuban population would be increasingly reluctant to oppose the regime. Direct action would still be required to bring down the Castro regiue. SOVIET REACTION TO USE G? MILITARY FORCE 18. In the cese of US use of force egainst Cuban territory, the iccally or for retalia- y lizelihcoé ef a Soviet response by force, eithe tion elsewhere, would be greater than in the case of bleckade. ‘The 217